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Increased breach occurrences in healthcare cause concern for health information as 
reported by the Federal Government.  Significant effort, regulations, and safeguards are 
in place to protect the systems used in the healthcare industry.  Employee handling of 
security remains an area of vulnerability related to security protocols.  The unified theory 
of acceptance and usage of technology (UTAUT) served as the model for this qualitative 
exploratory study with the purpose of understanding registered nurse (RN) perceptions 
and lived experiences related to IT security.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted 
with 20 participants from the Three Rivers Chapter American Association Critical Care 
Nurses.  Transcribed data were analyzed with a priori codes aligned to the constructs of 
UTAUT and emergent themes.  The emergent themes from the RNs’ lived experiences 
revealed perceptions of IT security mishandling, including walking away from the 
computer without log-off, and sharing of accounts through single sign on authenticated 
badges.  Strategic planning for the organizational IT security may be strengthened due to 
the insight about the RNs’ workflow related to IT security.  Understanding employee 
perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors to IT security allows for 
the ability as managers to apply that knowledge to IT security systems, access methods, 
and implement procedures that will provide for increased organizational IT security and 
increased patient confidence.  The social change from this work may provide 
contributions to the development of IT infrastructure systems for healthcare helping to 
create and maintain continued access to and availability of electronic medical records and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Security systems and the security of information technology (IT) have multiple 
components.  When these components are being managed in a complex environment, the 
exposure of having a weak link is monumental.  Ferguson, Schneier, and Kohno (2011) 
described the weakest link property as security being only as strong as the weakest link 
and they suggested that all users of IT understand the weakest link property and 
associated results. 
Employees within healthcare each hold responsibility toward maintaining the IT 
security of the system by using security practices set forth within the organization.  One 
important area for the organization is password use to access the network and other 
clinical devices.  For all healthcare IT, security is a critical aspect that requires protection 
and operational safeguards (Kruger & Anschutz, 2013).  The registered nurses’ (RNs’) 
perceptions of IT security are not well known and may influence the IT security risk 
management.  Further study into this gap of knowledge was the foundation for this study. 
Security practices include many aspects of password management that are clearly 
prescribed by the healthcare IT experts.  Unfortunately, these are not well understood or 
even known by clinical practice employees who are on the front lines of operational 
areas.  Furguson et al. (2011) discussed the development of improper passwords, and 
Albarrak (2012), Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015), and Medlin et al., (2008) were able to 
identify password mishandling by nurses, healthcare workers, and employees.  In this 
study, I explored the RNs’ perceptions of the IT security practices that are part of their 
professional role as seen through the lens of the behavioral constructs from the model of 
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the unified theory of acceptance and usage of technology (UTAUT), Venkatesh, Morris, 
Davis, and Davis, (2003) used as the conceptual framework for this study. 
In Chapter 1, I will outline the plan for the study and will include the background 
of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, research questions, 
conceptual framework, nature of the study, definitions, assumptions, scope and 
delimitations, limitations, and the significance of the study.  In the section of the 
significance of the study, I will describe the importance to the practice, theory, and social 
change. 
Background of the Study 
Security of IT in healthcare organizations is the responsibility of all employees 
within the organization, and most of those within would suspect that a breach in security 
would come from the outside.  However, according to Simpson (1996), most security 
issues are caused inadvertently by security mishandling internal to the organization.  Arce 
(2003) identified that the current weakest link is the personal computer in combination 
with people’s behaviors that create excessive vulnerability and produce insecure systems.  
These behaviors were identified in the top seven reasons for a data breach associated with 
authorized internal users (Kruger & Anschutz, 2013).  Tam, Glassman, and 
Vandenwauver (2010) discussed that human behavior is the weakest link in the 
maintenance of internet security because of the individual level of the knowledge and use 
of the passwords.  The behavior and use of the password practice by individuals, as it 
relates to the Internet, are behaviors that translate into other areas that require password 
protection (Cheswick, 2013).  Passwords are only a single aspect of the IT security within 
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the healthcare organization, which is a critical factor protecting access to the frontline 
security of the data and operations of the organization.  This data includes protected 
health information that is governed by several regulations including the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH), and other regulatory oversight.  IT 
security is complex, management of the IT security involves protecting the network, 
managing the users, and maintaining the appropriate IT security tools (Kruger & 
Anschutz, 2013).  Liu, Chung, Chen, and Wang (2012) identified that the healthcare 
security threats came from the employees internal to the system in 70% of the cases.  
These authors identified the complexity of variables in healthcare that leads to the many 
factors for potential internal breach of the system (Liu et al., 2012).  Like Simpson and 
Arce, Liu et al. identified the need for internal users to have knowledge of information 
security and good practice related to that experience. 
The healthcare industry uses IT security practices in both the clinical equipment 
for patient care and most of the patient information gathering, maintenance, and transfer 
within the acute care hospital environment as well as billing and collection.  The methods 
and level of the security maintenance by every RN are paramount to the organizational 
protection and overall risk management.  The behaviors they employ with the use of 
passwords and the security practices may correlate with the description by Kruger and 
Anschutz (2013) who discussed the access to the electronic patient health information 
gained either maliciously or nonmaliciously within the organizations.  These described 
behaviors and variant accessing of systems may be one cause for healthcare to be leading 
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in the number of data breaches as recorded in 2011 as among the top 10 industries 
(Kruger & Anschutz, 2013). 
Personal information security has become progressively more important with 
increased public awareness that has been heightened for multiple reasons, including 
increased reporting within the public-sector news reports, regular governmental 
statements, and targeted marketing to the public.  O'Harrow (2012) published an 
investigative report identifying the many vulnerabilities of IT security occurring within 
the healthcare industry identified over the course of a year.  These included password 
mishandling, insecure practices, known security access issues that were left unaddressed, 
and wireless device access points that were insecure, each allowing the organization open 
for risk of breach. 
With the recent hacking of Anthem, one of the United States largest Health 
Insurers, the American people are even more aware of vulnerabilities toward personal 
information and health information (Abelson & Goldstein, 2015, Balbi, 2015).  
Information to approximately 80 million records was available to the hackers once they 
gained entrance into the Anthem system.  A phishing scam was used to access the 
credentials of five employees from Anthem as reported by Amerigroup, the operating 
company of Anthem (Balbi, 2015).  Similar reports were reported by Verizon in the 2011 
data breach experience where phishing emails were opened and malware infected the 
executives’ laptops allowing access to the system (Baker et al., 2011). 
Access to health records is more desirable than gaining access to general credit 
accounts because the files from health records contain more information such as Social 
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Security numbers, birth dates, addresses of the individual and significant others, 
employment information, emergency contact information, and other personal 
information.  A collection of such personal information allows for rapid high-level 
identity theft.  Finkle (2013) discussed that Dell Secure Works identified in a recent 
report that hackers can sell complete health insurance credentials for $20 per set of data 
as opposed to $1 to $2 for each credit card number with a security code in underground 
markets.  The magnitude of potential profit with this type of transaction creates a very 
strong interest in the sale of this information that is causing the healthcare organizations 
to be more inviting targets for hackers and social engineers.  Finkle also discussed the 
statements by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warning that healthcare remains 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
Within the healthcare organization, employees functioning in the clinical arena 
face accessing the electronic systems and devices during and between patient care 
activities.  Each of these situations requires interaction with both the patient and the 
medical record and clinical devices.  The electronic health record is necessary for 
accessing and gathering information as well as entering data by members of the clinical 
team for varying reasons at differing points during the care continuum.  Potential issues 
that occur within each of these employee encounters with technology without accurate IT 
security becomes a management and organizational problem.  Employees using the 
systems without the application of principles from the four constructs of UTAUT 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003) may not appreciate or understand the importance or consequence 
of risk under which they place the organization. 
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A review of the literature related to the healthcare organization IT security reveals 
three important avenues for the future including: (a) the state of IT in the healthcare 
system interwoven with the employee perception, (b) the reporting structure with 
oversight management by the healthcare leadership, and (c) where the healthcare IT is 
headed in the future.  Bigalke (2009) discussed in order to fill the healthcare IT gap by 
2015 that it would take a focused effort and critical goals to change behaviors of staff 
while bringing in new technologies.  The existing literature aimed at the clinical provider 
presents the current state of IT security in healthcare as being focused on the electronic 
medical record and HIPAA. 
Simpson (1996) discussed that a lack of policy and procedure, education, and 
oversight from leadership within the organizations allows for breaches in the security.  IT 
leadership, healthcare organizations, and orientation programs have made strong attempts 
to address many of the issues that Simpson had discussed in the 90s.  Some organizations 
have implemented consequences causing workforce employee fear of not following the 
rules to be an effective measure for successful implementation (Workman, Bommer, & 
Straub, 2009).  Compliance with the security practice continues to be anecdotally 
reported in the popular business and healthcare literature and is captured along with the 
reports of the security breaches as they occur.  The business management problem 
continues to exist because there is a lack of research and insight into how breaches and 
violations of the security occur.  Simpson (1996) and Gaunt (2000) more than 15 years 
ago identified the lack of personal and professional responsibility to follow policies for 
information and system IT security.  There appears to be an abundance of literature 
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written related to the strengthening of policy and procedure within the healthcare 
organization IT and recommendations made for the education of staff associated with the 
security measures.   
Problem Statement 
IT initiatives and the security focuses in healthcare organizations have been 
related primarily to the electronic medical record, HIPAA, and business applications, all 
of which are aimed at protecting patient and organizational confidentiality and security 
(Graham, 2010). Measures taken to protect this security involve a vast array of security 
aspects, which protect the hardware and software applications used by employees of the 
healthcare organizations.  Even though the aspects associated with security fall within the 
scope of IT security, they require operational management and oversight.  One particular 
measure of the security management in healthcare is the maintenance of password 
confidentiality and security (Cazier & Medlin, 2006). 
Currently, 37.4% of all hospital labor costs are comprised of RN labor (Welton, 
2011).  As the RNs make up such a large portion of the employee base and are using the 
technology applications for multiple purposes, it is important to identify their knowledge 
related to the implications and consequences of the security risk and breach.  Albarrak 
(2012) identified that the behaviors of nurses allow for the potential security risk related 
to the password practices.  Nurses have been found to mishandle the passwords through 
sharing their information, exchanging the passwords, and ignoring the need for the 
password resets in Albarrak’s study (2012).  Fernández-Alemán et al. identified a 
8 
 
password sharing rate of 31.7% among healthcare workers.  Medlin et al. (2008) were 
able to show findings of 73% of respondents having shared their passwords. 
Security of healthcare IT is the responsibility of everyone within the organization.  
All employees are to have some understanding of what consequences might occur with 
an IT security breach.  The risk of the IT security breach occurring from internal security 
violations is a real threat to an organization (Chopra, 2013).  An internal breach of IT 
security may occur in many ways; however, for purposes of this study, inclusion of 
violations of the security practices, sharing or other mishandling of a password, and lack 
of the logoff procedure were explored.  The business management problem is that 
employee mishandling of IT security poses undue risk to an organization for potential 
risk of breach. 
Healthcare organizations expend huge amounts of resources, both human and 
financial, in efforts to protect the IT security.  At the core of this IT security is the intent 
to sustain the provision of integrated healthcare using electronic systems with vast 
communication and trust.  When this cycle of IT security is disrupted there is potential 
risk to the quality of care provided and the confidence of information being handled 
within the organization.  The narrower aspect of the problem, that of understanding RNs’ 
perceptions of IT security and related behaviors have not been explored in the literature.  
There is a documented and known need for IT security within the healthcare environment 
and that RNs have a responsibility to maintain IT security.  Consistent with the healthcare 
literature being limited to the research targeting the security as identified by Appari and 
Johnson (2010), the subset of the literature that would address the perception of the RN 
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users maintaining responsibility for and proper application of the IT security as part of 
their professional role is absent.  There is a gap in knowledge related to the RNs’ 
perception of what their role is in maintaining the IT security. 
Purpose of the Study 
Little research exists to provide reliable information to address the business 
management problem of RNs’ perceptions of their role in relationship to IT security and 
how they manage passwords.  To gain insight into this gap, a qualitative study was 
conducted “searching for meaning and understanding” (Merriam, 2014, p. 39) from the 
perspective of the employees own contextual interactions within the healthcare 
organization.  The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of 
the RN within four of the constructs of UTAUT that are specific to use behavior 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003).  The experiences and perceptions of the RN were analyzed as 
they relate to the UTAUT constructs of performance expectancy, effort expectancy, 
social influence, and facilitating conditions.  Themes that emerged within each construct 
were independently analyzed. 
The outcomes of this study are now available to provide insight into a large 
portion of the healthcare workforce, thus allowing employee education and development 
to become a part of organizational frameworks.  The elimination or reduction of barriers 
in the security practices that are necessary within the healthcare workforce must allow for 
engagement with the employee allowing that employee the ability to perceive how the 
UTAUT constructs of performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and 
facilitating conditions are each applicable in relation to IT security.  If employees 
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perceive these constructs as pertinent to practice, they will apply them to the work and 
maintain the security of the system.  The risk to overall security breach for the 
organization is likely to then be reduced due to the increased provision of improvements 
to the global security practice. 
Research Questions 
The following is the overarching question that was used for this qualitative study: 
What are RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT 
security? 
The following research questions provided the supportive data designed to guide 
the work of this research using the four constructs of UTAUT that are consistent with 
behavioral intention and use behavior. 
RQ 1: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the performance expectancy of IT security practice? 
RQ 2: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the effort expectancy related to the IT security practice? 
RQ 3: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the social influence related to the IT security practice? 
RQ 4: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the facilitating conditions of the IT security practice? 
Conceptual Framework 
Venkatesh et al. (2003) described the model UTAUT, which served as the 
theoretical base to support and guide this research work of the security practices of RNs.  
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This theoretical base provided the foundational framework to identify the clinicians’ 
knowledge levels, understanding of the password management processes, implications of 
a breach, and the applications of both the policy incorporation and education of the 
security practice within the acute care environment.  Venkatesh et al.’s use of identifying 
and incorporating the determinants that influence the behavioral intentions to use 
technology within UTAUT is an ideal match for this study.  Use of this model provided 
the depth and breadth necessary for the assessment of the definition and relationships to 
guide exploration toward identifying perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported 
behaviors of the RNs within the study structure.  The UTAUT model delves into the 
construct of use behavior that lies at the core of adoption and sustaining practice. 
Venkatesh et al. (2003) developed and validated the UTAUT model and they 
claimed the previously published acceptance theories were fragmented and incomplete in 
nature.  The like context and components from eight models of theory were incorporated 
for analysis, testing, validation, and final confirmation that the UTAUT model would 
stand statistically proven having clearer definition and improvement toward the intention 
of behavior.  Following testing within the study, UTAUT was shown to perform stronger 
than the eight models from which it was drawn.  This strong performance is one of the 
reasons UTAUT had been chosen for the work of measuring the security practices of 
RNs.  Four of the seven constructs identified within UTAUT are important in the 
behavior of the user as identified by Venkatesh et al.  The four constructs include 
performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, each of which contributes to 
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behavioral intention, and then facilitating conditions, which contribute to use behavior 








Figure 1. Constructs of UTAUT contributing to use behavior. Adapted and used with 
permission from CCC (Appendix 1) from “User Acceptance of Information Technology: 
Toward a Unified View,” by V. Venkatesh, M. G. Morris, G. B. Davis, and F. D. Davis, 
2003, MIS Quarterly, 46(2), p. 447. 
 
The four UTAUT constructs that are described in this study, performance 
expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions, appeal to the 
specific aspect of the security practice that was explored.  Performance expectancy plays 
a role in the employees’ usage of the security practices.  The belief the employees have 
will help them maintain aspects of their job that pertain to the patient, medical record, 
and system security.  Exploration of how the identified employee perceives that work is 
influenced by the security practices and may or may not be enhanced or improved by 
these practices.  Effort expectancy is associated with how easy it is to use the security 
practices.  Employee perceptions related to the security practice ease may have a direct 
correlation with the utilization of those security practices.  Social influence is the method 
for which the employee perceives his or her peers or significant other relevant 
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professionals in the clinical environment believe they should be using the security 
practices.  Within this study, the employee perceptions of social influence was an 
important aspect of the clinical setting related to varying levels of social support that may 
or may not permit sharing of passwords, mishandling of passwords, and other security 
issues, including no log-off. 
Facilitating conditions, as perceived by the employee, include the technical 
methods that support the RN in using the security practices.  There was expected to be a 
direct correlation between employee perceptions of the security practice facilitation 
through the conditions of technical approaches in this study exploration.  Each of these 
constructs helped to convey insight and understanding to the security practice of the 
employee in the healthcare work environment.  The literature review within Chapter 2 
provides more in depth detail and insight into the conceptual framework information and 
methods as they were planned for this study. 
Nature of the Study 
A qualitative case study design was used to determine the perceived experiences 
of the RNs recruited for this study.  The value of a qualitative study brings into view the 
meaning of the problem being studied within the research as the user sees, experiences, or 
understands his or her world (Merriam, 2014).  The qualitative study allows for 
interviewing the employees of the organization thus providing insight into the RNs’ 
perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of the IT security and 
while using the constructs of UTAUT to guide the research.  The interview is better to 
understand the lived experience of the individuals by listening to their stories and 
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collecting A priori results aligned to the constructs of UTAUT and emergent themes not 
necessarily bounded. 
The advantage that the qualitative case study with an interview process allowed 
over the quantitative methodology included the indepth description and analysis of the 
phenomenon for which the RN was experiencing related to the use of the IT security 
practices.  Within this study, determining the interaction of significant factors within the 
healthcare environment and the role they play in the constructs of UTAUT were 
conducted.  These are aspects that would not be able to reveal themselves in a 
quantitative study, thus it was a potential advantage of the qualitative approach with 
interviewing. 
Data gathering and maintainance was done using ethical research principles.  The 
population was drawn from within the professional nursing organization of critical care 
nurses in the acute healthcare rich regional area of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  The 
requirements of participation included that the individual must be an RN and also a 
member of the professional organization Three Rivers Chapter American Association of 
Critical Care Nurses (AACN), work full time in a clinical environment, have been 
oriented to the work environment, have authentication (sign on) privileges to the 
electronic record in the work environment, and have access to the work policies.  The 
results of this qualitative case study were based on the representation from the personal 
interviews.  I conducted interviews with 20 participants and had saturation reached within 
that population.  The data analysis software NVivo v11 was used to facilitate the process 
of coding, sorting, trending, and managing the data.  Themes emerged from the data, and 
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I analyzed those themes.  Chapter 3 provides a more in-depth description of interview, 
data collection, and data maintenance processes, along with the data analysis strategy. 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this study, the following terms are defined: 
 Authentication: Method of identification or validation that the user is legitimate 
and may have entry to the system for which he or she is attempting to access resources or 
services (Milenković, Latinović, & Simić, 2013, Rajarajan, Prabhu, Palanivel, & 
Karthikeyan, 2014). 
Clinical workflow: This is the pattern of RN work in time and motion as it relates 
to patient care, assessment, medication administration, patient information 
communication and documentation, charge nurse and preceptor duties, incorporation of 
clinical devices and technology including the electronic medical record, and other work 
of the clinical environment as carried out by the RN as part of an assignment 
responsibility according to policy and procedure or protocol/practice (Kashiwagi et al., 
2016, Koloroutis, 2004, Zheng, Haftel, Hirschl, O'Reilly, & Hanauer, 2010). 
Clinician: A person such as a doctor or nurse who works directly with patients 
rather than in a laboratory or as a researcher (Clinician, n.d.). 
Intranet: This is a connection of workstations, personal computers, clinical 
devices sharing information, or host systems that are all internally managed in the 
organization and for internal use (Liu et al., 2012).  A firewall protects the intranet 
creating a separateness from the Internet that is private. 
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IT security policy awareness: This is the individual awareness of the 
consequences of failing to comply with the organizational security policies (Rotvold, 
2008). 
Security practice: This is the behavior the nurses use to maintain the security or 
not by properly authenticating and maintaining the security of their accounts in order to 
protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data (Chopra, 2013). 
Security risk: This is influenced by the security practice and is defined as a threat 
that the password privacy or other access to the account has exposure of a kind including 
a violation during use due to deviation from policy, protocol, or practice, that has allowed 
for the threat of harm potentially rendering the system no longer secure (Rotvold, 2008). 
Single sign on (SSO): A system functionality providing the end user the ability to 
authenticate only one time yet have full use of all systems for which they would usually 
be required to provide authentication (Milenković et al., 2013).  This functionality will 
allow the user increased ease of use and decreased time spent authenticating. 
Wireless on wheels (WOW): This is a common term used for a mobile cart with a 
computer that can be used for clinical applications. 
Assumptions 
A working assumption of this qualitative study was that I would act as an 
effective and unbiased data collection instrument with the competencies and abilities 
required of an interviewer including each of the following: (a) a questioning stance with 
regard to work and life context, (b) high tolerance for ambiguity, (c) being a careful 
observer, (d) asking good questions, (e) thinking inductively, and (f) comfort with writing 
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(Merriam, 2014).  It was assumed that there would be a full review of the interview tool 
to assure that the tool was unbiased prior to use for the interview.  I would perform with 
integrity and an ethically unbiased stance throughout the interview (Merriam, 2014).  I 
would use bracketing to avoid bias.  Registered nurses of the Three Rivers Chapter 
AACN would have e-mail accounts and have access to the Internet.  This medium allows 
for communication, access, and response, to research communication.  There was also an 
assumption that RNs of the Three Rivers Chapter AACN would be capable of 
participating in research.  The environment of work within most organizations allows for 
and encourages professional participation in research.  Research participation is a cultural 
norm and part of the mission statement within the professional realm of nursing at the 
Three Rivers Chapter of AACN.  It was assumed that the RNs have had previous 
exposure to the terms used in this research study and had a basic understanding of IT 
security.  Another assumption was that the RNs within the membership of Three Rivers 
Chapter of AACN would voluntarily participate and that they would answer honestly and 
completely when interviewed in the research study becoming an integral influence to the 
integrity of the study. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of this research was limited to one specific professional group, the 
RNs.  The participating professional RNs were geographically chosen from one specific 
professional organization within a large geographic region.  The content of understanding 
and exploration is targeted to areas concerning the security practice, security risk, and 
security awareness.  The four constructs of UTAUT (a) performance expectancy, (b) 
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effort expectancy, (c) social influence, and (d) facilitating conditions were explicitly 
explored.  The results of the RN perceptions of the IT security is reported and discussed 
in Chapter 4.  The research boundaries were determined by the population contributing to 
the data collection and overall research findings.  Exploration for context-dependent 
knowledge emerged at the point when saturation was reached with this population. 
Limitations 
Limitations of this study included that the study sample of RNs represented a 
single professional nursing organization and therefore lacked generalizability.  The 
results from this population represent the security behaviors that can be provided in a 
limited descriptive presentation but are not be predictive of the future behaviors of other 
RN populations due to multiple contributing factors within each geographic region and 
organization.  Additionally, the study participants were self-reporting.  Limitations of 
self-reported results may contain bias, are not able to be verified, and are influenced by 
past or current situational experience (Brutus, Aguinis, & Wassmer, 2013).  The members 
may have experienced frequent surveying by their hospitals, other agencies, and other 
researchers that could have created the limitation of a lower yield in an interest of 
participating in this study.  Lastly, a final limitation is that the RN’s concern for the 
identification or potential for leakage of information potentially leading to disciplinary 
action due to variance from policy may have yielded false or dishonest response, limited 
response, or nonresponse to the questions within the interview process. 
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Significance of the Study 
The potential yield for positive social change as it relates to the IT security and 
the impact that it has in the healthcare arena is substantial.  Chen, Nyemba, and Malin 
(2012) discussed that the lack of security in the healthcare systems may be due to the 
complexity and allows for risk behavior related to electronic medical record handling.  
There are many challenges in the healthcare industry related to security and management 
of the security systems.  Public perception of the protected health information security 
and confidence of the security of their individual files are of high importance.  Through 
the identification of the security behaviors, organizations may be able to convey a strong 
public confidence in an improved manner with stronger public perception. 
Significance to Practice  
For most individuals, healthcare providers and administrators, the aspects of the 
security are considered to include the electronic medical record and the aspects of 
HIPAA, but they do not often think of the operational systems and management 
objectives that are required to secure the systems and tools used to house and access 
information.  The IT security system for not only patient information but organizational 
information is large and complex including but not limited to servers, data warehouses, 
networks, Internet, intranet, multiple vendor clinical products (both hardware and 
software), and the most commonly thought of accessioning devices such as personal 
computers.  Organizational leaders must manage and safeguard the employee practices as 
they relate to the IT security including workflows and authentication practices.  
Awareness of the employees practice to carry out the accurate procedure and process for 
20 
 
security behavior and management may be an arduous task.  Insight into how registered 
nurses, one specific group of healthcare employees, practice and relate to the IT security 
will influence development and security system builds.  Stronger insight and 
understanding of employee use of the security applications will allow administrative and 
IT oversight to create the policy and procedure that are nurse, clinician, employee, and 
patient care friendly so that the healthcare organizations are less susceptible to risk.  
Removal or reduction of the barriers to using the IT security along with an improved 
insight of employee perception will be helpful in developing a stronger process for 
creating the security compliance. 
Significance to Theory 
Future research recommendations by Venkatesh et al. (2003) included 
understanding organizational outcomes associated with the technology.  The current 
literature related to theory does not connect the IT security practices of employees with 
the perceptions of the four constructs of UTAUT that contribute to use behavior.  
Allowing a pathway for understanding the connection between theory and perception 
may lead to a positive change in behavior of use as the constructs become meaningful as 
related to IT security in healthcare. 
Outcomes of this work did provide insight into the role of the employees in the 
healthcare organizations related to the IT security allowing for a refreshed, focused, and 
successful planning and governance approach to the organizational IT security within the 
strategic plan.  This study contributes to the field of IT security-specific to the healthcare 
security management and risk mitigation.  It adds new knowledge in the fields of 
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employee behavior related to the security and creates awareness regarding the importance 
of the perceptions of the RNs role related to the security management.  Based on the 
findings of this work a framework will be established from which social change may be 
promoted by helping employees to gain ease of use in the security practices.  The change 
in the promotion of the security practices may be accomplished by eliminating or 
reducing barriers that will decrease the risk of protected health information release and 
overall security breaches for an organization thus improving global security practice. 
In the workflow of nursing practice, the role of maintaining IT security is an 
elemental part of the RN role and may be a newly recognized finding from this study.  If 
this is an outcome, there will be an opportunity for nurses to be within the early adopter 
stage of IT security.  Taken from Rogers's Diffusion of Innovations (1962), “An early 
adopter or Lighthouse Customer is an early customer of a given company, product, or 
technology; in politics, fashion, art, and other fields, this person would be referred to as a 
trendsetter” (p. 283). 
Significance to Social Change 
Utilization behavior of the employee is determined through four of the constructs 
identified by Venkatesh et al. (2003).  If the employee perceives these to be important, 
then he or she will find the purpose of the IT security to be valuable and applicable to 
their practice.  The anticipated implications to social change for the healthcare industry 
include identifying the gap between current theory and perception of employees related to 
IT security.  The lack of secure password handling by nurses as described by both 
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Albarrak (2012) and Medlin et al. (2008) in each of their respective studies identifies one 
large subset of healthcare employees who expose the healthcare organization to risk. 
Healthcare costs in the United States of America were at 17.4 % of the gross 
domestic product in 2013, according to the Medicare and Medicaid Services (2014).  
These healthcare costs include the burden of technology costs, security, and breach 
recovery.  Improvements in the process related to the IT security in the healthcare arena 
would allow for a potential impact of cost reduction, patient safety, and patient 
satisfaction.  Provided the employees were engaged within each of the four constructs 
that lead to use behavior the resulting change in security protection would ultimately 
position healthcare for cost reductions as a result of the decreased breach and risk.  
Agaku, Adisa, Ayo-Yusuf, and Connolly (2014) concluded that increased strategies 
include higher security for the protected health information so that the trust of the 
information security will not be undermined any further.  Recent public reports of 
security breaches within the healthcare insurance companies serve to continue the media 
surge that raise general citizen concern that hospitals are more at risk causing lack of 
confidence.  The general public is concerned with privacy and their general security of 
the information.  The Federal Governments Office for Civil Rights at the Department of 
Human Services reported that over the last 5 years, there were 740 major security 
breaches within healthcare that affected 29 million people (as cited in Abelson & 
Goldstein, 2015).  Increasing the security within the healthcare organizations creates a 
more confident feeling for patients individually and extends to the global public who 
become more comfortable.  The work of identifying one population’s perceptions with 
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gained insight and potential for improvement of the IT security behavior and handling of 
security practices may become the catalyst to some of the change that is needed in 
healthcare security processes related to IT management that will promote increased 
patient confidence. 
Through these aspects of the research, positive social change may be fully 
realized in two categories.  The first is that when users are more confident that 
information is secure, they are more apt to use the electronic health record and with 
increased use, there is potential for maximizing healthcare delivery.  Second, when 
organizations are able to reduce costs and resources used for security, those resources can 
be deployed for other healthcare contributions, such as providing additional disease 
prevention, community education, and further research toward healthcare advancements. 
Summary and Transition 
One-third of the labor force within the hospital is comprised of RNs, and they 
make critical decisions related to the operational use of current information systems.  The 
RN influences his/her peers, subordinates, and other professionals within the clinical 
teams.  Identifying RN knowledge related to the implications and consequences of the 
system and information security risk and breach are important.  By researching the RNs 
operational applications of the security practice and security risk behaviors, there will be 
a new benefit to the organization for multiple purposes.  The nurses’ perceptions, 
expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of the IT security were explored using 
the process outlined in this chapter.  Chapter 2 encompasses a review of the literature 
presenting a foundational frame for this work.  In this review, I will identify the IT 
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security in the healthcare setting as it relates to nursing and nursing awareness of a 
potential breach and risk management.  The theoretical UTAUT model is incorporated 
into the review along with the IT security literature and a discussion of the application 
into the clinical environment.  A view through the lens of the security awareness and how 
organizations approach education and policy setting are included in the review.  Chapter 
3 includes the research design, qualitative case study methodology, development of the 
interview tool, data collection methods, and methods for data coding, data analysis, and 
statistical analysis.  Chapter 4 covers the discussion of techniques used for analysis of the 
data revealing findings in relationship to the research questions.  Finally, Chapter 5 
addresses the implications of the findings along with limitations and conclusions of the 
work, as well as any identified avenues for future research.  Implications for social 
change are incorporated into the final discussion. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Within Chapter 2, literature is identified and reviewed to frame and set a 
foundation for this qualitative case study of the security practices of registered nurses 
(RNs).  Information Technology (IT) security and breach literature are available in depth 
and breadth in many fields and specialties.  The literature focus for this study is narrowed 
to the management of IT security specific to the way that healthcare employees take a 
role in the safeguarding of such.  Literature search strategy methods, an overview of the 
literature review search, conceptual framework, and literature associated with the 
foundational development of the research are discussed. 
This study relates to Albarrak’s (2012) research that found nurses used 
inappropriate security practice and password handling and then discussed that their 
behavior may pose a security threat up to and including a breach.  The business 
management problem proposed for exploration is the aspect of employee handling of IT 
security and the level of risk upon an organization with an associated potential for risk of 
breach.  A data breach may occur in confidential patient information, proprietary 
information, and general organizational risk mitigation efforts if the mishandling of IT 
security occurs.  The focus on IT security was explored through the lens of the unified 
theory of acceptance and usage of technology (UTAUT).  The purpose of this study was 
to explore the perceptions of the RN within four of the constructs of UTAUT that are 
specific to use behavior (Venkatesh et al., 2003).  Within this chapter, I reviewed current 
literature that relates to the concepts of IT security within the realm of security practices 
that nurse would use when managing a password and logging on and off of systems for 
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which they are authorized to authenticate and access.  Literature related to the purpose of 
this study is aimed at inclusion of violations of security practices, sharing or other 
mishandling of a password, lack of logoff, and the theoretical framework of UTAUT.  
The aspects of IT security in alignment with the four constructs of UTAUT remained the 
focus of the literature review even though there are many other concerns of an internal 
breach of security. 
Literature Search Strategy 
I accessed the Walden Library for scholarly peer-reviewed literature using the 
search engines EBSCO host, AIB/INFORMS Complete, MEDLINE, CINAHL Plus, 
PUBMED, COMPUTERS and APPLIED SCIENCESCOMPLETE, and Google Scholar.  
While using these search engines, the key search terms of security, breach, password(s), 
information technology, nurse(s), and healthcare were used.  The initial Boolean search 
via EBSCO host using search terms information technology, security, and healthcare 
yielded 183 articles.  The Boolean search via EBSCO host using search terms 
information technology, security, and nursing yielded 18 articles.  The Boolean search 
via EBSCO host using search terms technology, security, and nursing yielded 107 
articles.  Password searches related to nursing produced only one article.  Literature 
analysis did not result in a significant volume of scholarly works and journal articles that 
addressed security related to password use in the healthcare setting. Literature related to 
the theoretical foundation for this research, which focused on UTAUT and the other 
acceptance models of technology that were precursors are included in the conceptual 
framework.  The precursors to UTAUT include the technology acceptance model as it 
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evolved in 2003 (TAM 2), the original technology acceptance model (TAM), and the 
seminal work done by Rogers (2003) the fifth edition of his original work Diffusion of 
Innovations all of which were accessed and incorporated into this review. 
Conceptual Framework 
The incorporation of theory into this chapter required a thorough investigation of 
the books and journal articles related to IT and are discussed within the major themes of 
IT adoption, application, and usage.  The theme of perception, as it relates to behavior, is 
described in the works of the developing theories of IT adoption.  The theme of IT 
adoption, application, and usage theory work, which has evolved through Rogers (2003), 
Venkatesh, and Davis, (2000), and Venkatesh et al. (2003) is discussed and reviewed.  
These works and their constructs are discussed in detail as they have been evolving since 
the inception of the initial diffusion model with adoption to the application of this study 
using constructs from within UTAUT. 
The theoretical foundation for this study is the unified theory of acceptance and 
usage of technology (UTAUT) as described by Venkatesh et al. (2003).  The four core 
constructs that influence behavioral intention to use technology within UTAUT that are 
discussed and used for this study include performance expectancy, effort expectancy, 
social influence, and facilitating conditions. 
Performance expectancy plays a role in the RNs’ usage of the security practices 
due to the belief it will help them maintain aspects of their job that pertain to patient, 
medical record, and system security.  Within the construct of performance expectancy, 
the user finds the system to be useful in his or her job and helpful in accomplishing tasks, 
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improving productivity, and increasing opportunity for pay increase (Venkatesh et al., 
2003).  Exploration of how the RN perceives that work is influenced by the security 
practices and may or may not be enhanced or improved by these practices.  When the 
culture of the organization supports IT security, there may be an inherent tendency 
toward support of the necessary behaviors within this construct. 
Effort expectancy is associated with how easy it is to use the security practices.  
Within the construct of effort expectancy, the user finds the system to help with clear 
communication, improve system skill, create ease of system use, and make learning easy 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003).  Within this study exploration of RN perceptions of security 
practice ease may have a direct correlation to the use of those security practices that were 
explored.  When IT security is part of the workflow and is helpful to clinical care, 
employees are more likely to include the associated behaviors required to carry the 
security measures out fully. 
Social influence is the method by which the RN perceives others, such as his or 
her peers or significant other important professionals in the clinical environment and the 
belief that they should be using the security practices.  Within the construct of social 
influence, the user believes that the way he or she uses the system is important to their 
peers and will influence their use as well as the reverse their peers are influential to the 
way he or she are using the system.  Equally important within this construct is that if the 
business leaders believe the system should be used, and the organization supports the 
system use these influences may have social influence on the end users (Venkatesh et al., 
2003).  Within this study, the RN perceptions of social influence are an important aspect 
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within the clinical setting related to varying levels of social support that may or may not 
permit sharing of passwords, mishandling of passwords, and other security issues such as 
no log-off. 
Facilitating conditions as perceived by the RN, include the technical methods that 
support the RN in using the security practices.  Within the construct of facilitating 
conditions, the users believe they have resources and knowledge required to use the 
system, they determine if it is compatible with other systems that they use, and they have 
someone to assist them when needed (Venkatesh et al., 2003).  Within this study, 
exploration of RN perceptions of security practice facilitation through the conditions of 
technical approaches was expected to have a direct correlation. 
Each of these constructs help to understand the security practice of the RN in the 
clinical environment while performing the duties of clinical workflow.  Venkatesh et al. 
(2003) described the performance expectancy, effort expectancy, and social influence as 
the three direct determinates of intention to use the system.  These constructs along with 
the facilitating conditions described as a direct determinant of usage behavior are the 
reasons for these four constructs being chosen as the foundational constructs from which 
to conduct this study. 
Adoption of technology is an area of important literature as it relates to the human 
interactions with technology applicable to the development of UTAUT.  Historically, the 
first provision for context of adoption and diffusion of innovation that explained the 
acceptance of technology using empirical models derived from social cognitive theory 
began with Rogers (2003).  Rogers (2004) identified attributes contributing to adoption 
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that include, (a) relative advantage: The innovation is perceived as better than the 
precursor, (b) ease of use: Degree to which innovation is perceived to be difficult to use, 
(c) image: Perception that the innovation will enhance one’s status, (d) visibility: Ability 
to see the system used within the organization, (e) compatibility: Degree to which 
innovation can coexist with values, culture, and goals of adopters, (f) results 
demonstrability: Ability of using the innovation results, and (g) voluntariness of use: 
Perception of innovation being voluntary.   
The technology acceptance model (TAM) was later described by Davis (1989) at 
which time the user acceptance behavior was defined.  TAM revealed that the individual 
user has an attitude toward the system that influences his/her beliefs about the system, 
which in turn determines how he or she will react and use the system.  Within the 
development of TAM the following constructs are identified: (a) perceived usefulness, 
(b) perceived ease of use, (c) external variables, (d) attitude toward using, and (e) 
behavioral intention to use.  Each of these constructs plays a role in the user’s willingness 
to use the system. 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) identified that usage intentions do supersede the 
perceived usefulness and ease of use of mandatory systems in their model of TAM2 
which extends TAM.  TAM and TAM2 become foundational work for UTAUT and are 





Albarrak (2012) has identified that the behaviors of nurses when handling 
passwords include sharing of information, exchanging passwords, ignoring logoff 
procedures, and allowing for lack of secure procedures in other aspects, which place the 
organization at risk for breach.  Organizations face the risk of security breach and must 
be aware of internal violations that create this situation (Chopra, 2013).  The business 
management problem is that there is a documented and known need for IT security within 
the healthcare environment and that the RN maintains IT security, but current literature 
does not address the perception of the RN users maintaining responsibility for and proper 
application of IT security as part of their professional role. 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of the 
RN within the constructs of the unified theory of acceptance and usage of technology 
(UTAUT) as described by Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis (2003).  The relationship 
of the UTAUT four constructs performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social 
influence, and facilitating conditions aligned with the research design and aspects of the 
study specific to security behavior of the employee.  Each of these is specific to use 
behavior.  Additional purposeful outcomes of this study are expected to include 
development of a framework for reducing barriers in security practices that are necessary 
within the RN workflow, decreasing risk of protected health information release, and 
decreasing security breach for the organization by providing knowledge areas for 
improvement to the overall security practice. 
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Information Security in Healthcare 
Previous healthcare research related to information security is scarce, so other 
specialties and categories of literature analysis are included within this review 
encompassing general and specific aspects of information security not related to 
healthcare.  There is expansive literature related to HIPAA but the focus of security for 
this study relates to the electronic environment in which databases of information allow 
clinical employees access.  The implementation of the electronic health record thwarted 
efforts to enhance security with a range of oversight policies from categories of 
organizational to governmental (McGonigle & Mastrian 2015).  Healthcare organizations 
worked diligently to implement electronic health records as incentivized dollars became 
available from the government.  Healthcare organizations faced growing technology 
infrastructure and associated growing needs for maintaining information security plans 
and strategies for maintaining their systems.  The development of information security 
through regulation and culture began to affect the way those healthcare organizations and 
their employees relate to the concept of security. 
Before 2004, there was concern within the United States about the coordination of 
medical information and the ability to move toward an electronic platform to house 
medical information and data (Sochalski & Weiner, 2011).  Decision making related to 
the movement of electronic medical records became a legislative agenda item and moved 
to the federal government.  The migration of paper charts to electronic health records 
within 10 years became a forefront issue with the healthcare industry challenged by 
President George W. Bush’s administration in 2004 to make this become a reality (Kirby, 
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2015).  This challenge to become electronic included the sharing of a patient’s 
documented medical history throughout the patient care continuum no matter where 
delivering care occurred.  Medical information being maintained by IT systems became a 
point of conversation in the American household as much as in the healthcare arena.  
When the economic stimulus package was signed into legislation as part of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 there was a creation of a new vision 
for expansion of health IT (Sochalski & Weiner, 2011).  This act is the driving force 
behind what most healthcare providers know as meaningful use. 
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH) Act is an important part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.  
Essential components of HITECH include certified electronic health record technology 
that meets governmental standards, enterprise integration that links all healthcare 
providers to enable information exchange, and qualified electronic health records to 
handle all necessary information needs to provide healthcare related needs (Graham, 
2010, Kwon & Johnson, 2012, McGonigle & Mastrian, 2015).  HITECH has aimed to 
improve healthcare quality, reduced costs due to inadequacies, improved overall health, 
facilitated future care through research, and secured a realm to house patient information.  
HITECH and healthcare leaders’ focuses maintain alignment towards the same goals and 
visions (McGonigle & Mastrian 2015).  The implementation of this program began the 
incentive for healthcare systems to make a substantial investment in the implementation 
of IT systems that would maintain patient information and data. 
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The introduction of meaningful use along with the HITECH legislation by the 
federal government occurred in 2009 as a part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act.  Healthcare organizations are “scurrying to select decisively, 
implement, enhance, or measure the care impact of electronic health records so they may 
achieve the meaningful use criteria” (Murphy, 2011, p. 153).  Meeting the meaningful 
use criteria allows for the qualification of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
Incentive payments.  The incentive payments allow for continued support of the 
healthcare infrastructure. 
Regulatory compliance in IT is a factor that influences the governance of the 
management and operations in all businesses.  When applied to the healthcare industry 
there are not only the aspects of IT governance but also the overlapping health IT 
governance including HIPAA and HITECH.   Project planning incorporates security 
practice in healthcare from the point of plan development through implementation and 
adoption.  The security practices and regulatory compliance of such within the healthcare 
industry is a segment of manageable practice.  Several regulatory agencies provide 
guidance and oversite related to the security of healthcare practice and management.  
These regulatory agencies include the US Department of Health and Human Services 
regulations, HITECH, HIPAA, and state regulations.  Kwon and Johnson (2012) reported 
that there is varying compliance in security practice within the healthcare industry due to 
differing interpretations of the guidance and written compliance directives.  
Safeguarding, auditing, HR management, and third party security management were the 
four types of security practices identified as used when reviewing the organizations that 
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maintained high levels of security leaders (Kwon & Johnson, 2014).  Within their 
research, the authors found that the hospitals with high rankings in the adoption of 
security practice and compliance with the technical aspects still varied in the application 
of practice.  The authors believed this variation was a result of the adoption of policy and 
procedure and to what level that infusion into the organization occurred.  This 
representation of necessity for technical and non-technical solution adoption done 
simultaneously is paramount. 
For most individuals, healthcare providers, and administrators, the aspects of 
security include the electronic medical record and aspects of HIPAA, but they do not 
often think of the operational systems and management objectives that are required to 
secure the systems and tools used to house and access information.  The IT security 
system not only for patient information but also for organizational information is large 
and complex including but not limited to, servers, data warehouses, networks, Internet, 
intranet, multiple vendor clinical products (both hardware and software), and the most 
commonly thought of for accessioning devices such as PCs.  Clinicians within the 
healthcare organization, depending on their role and daily functions, each have 
workflows and the need for access to gain and or enter information.  For all the 
previously mentioned components of the system to be protected, those employees who 
access the system must be legitimate, and the system must sustain levels of strict security 
and privacy.  Authentication of the employee is one way of maintaining these objectives 
for the system security, and passwords are one way of authenticating.  Authentication is 
the method of identification or validation that the user is legitimate and may have entry to 
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the system for which they are attempting to access resources or services (Milenković, 
Latinović, & Simić, 2013, and Rajarajan, Prabhu, Palanivel, & Karthikeyan, 2014).  The 
healthcare organizations attempt to assure ease of use related to secure practice by 
implementing authentication practices using single sign-on (SSO) allowing the user ease 
of access to multiple applications.  According to Milenković et al. single sign-on allows 
the user increased ease of use and decreased time spent authenticating because of the 
functionality to authenticate only once and have full use of all systems.  With 
authentication methods known and established by the organization for employees, it is up 
to the employee to carry out the accurate procedure and process for security behavior and 
management. 
Another aspect of employee interaction with IT security is the use of devices.  
Koivunen, Niemi, and Hupli (2014) demonstrated in the study of health professionals 
using communication devices that barriers prevent correct processes toward security and 
tools for best outcomes are not always present even if the user wants to use secure 
practices.  Healthcare organizations are accountable for security practices of the 
employees and with this study, Koiven et al. (2014) identified that healthcare needs more 
information to support better the growing field of device management and security. 
Leaders of the organizations take responsibility for overseeing the IT security 
programs from all aspects of development, implementation, and evaluation to assure it is 
ongoing and protecting the organization.  Often the Chief Information Officer (CIO) is 
the individual to lead the organization with focused information related to the 
management and oversight of IT security.  Landolt, Hirschel, Schlienger, Businger, and 
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Zbinden (2012) conducted a study of 112 hospitals in German-speaking Switzerland 
gaining information from the CIOs to find if the organizations were compliant with the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) standard ISO/IEC 27002.  The study investigated if the standards 
implementation was nothing through to complete.  Of 51 responding hospitals, there was 
a 51.1% score of implementation.  Switzerland has an implementation plan suggesting 
that the hospitals are facing difficulty in implementation with the standards similarly to 
many other countries.  Interestingly, the university hospitals have lower percent 
compliance than the private hospitals but it was not statistically significant.  This study 
demonstrates another set of standards and a group of leaders attempting to oversee 
security measures for healthcare organizations. 
IT security is complex, management of the IT security involves protecting the 
network, managing the users, and maintaining the appropriate IT security tools (Kruger & 
Anschutz, 2013).  In a review of current statistical data conducted by Liu, Chung, Chen, 
and Wang (2012), they identified that the healthcare security threats came from the 
employees internal to the system in 70% of the cases.  These authors identified the 
complexity of variables in healthcare that leads to the many factors for potential internal 
breach of the system.  Box and Pottas (2013) discussed that the general operational 
functioning of healthcare professionals is naturally within an honorable and trusting 
community culturally implicit of a low threshold for need of security sensitivity.  




Enhancements of security are an avenue that continuously develops even as the 
basic security measures remain weak or continue development at the same time.  Liu et 
al. discussed advancing the protection of the medical information using firewalls since 
most healthcare organizations now use the internet as part of their regular course of 
business.  Like Simpson (1996) and Arce (2003), Liu et al. identified the need for internal 
users to have knowledge of information security and good practice related to that 
experience.  Organizational IT security depends on the secure behaviors of all employees. 
The healthcare industry uses IT security practices in both the clinical equipment 
for patient care and most of the patient information gathering, maintenance, and transfer 
within the acute care hospital environment as well as billing and collection.  Intranet and 
Internet use by the employees are areas of importance for clinical attention similar to all 
clinical devices.  The intranet is an internal connection for the workstations, personal 
computers, clinical devices sharing information, or host systems that are as a group 
internally managed in the organization and for internal use (Liu et al., 2012).  Firewall 
protection separates data used on this internal system from the Internet and maintains a 
secure privacy.  The internet allows open access between the organization and the 
“Internet highway” diminishing security practice thus many healthcare clinical desktops 
that use clinical applications including the electronic medical record do not allow open 
access, but limited - controlled access, to the Internet.  Chen, Nyemba, and Malin (2012) 
discuss the predictability of behavior related to the employee handling the medical record 
in comparison to social technology computing companies like Twitter.  The findings that 
they presented included healthcare organizations being stable inclusive of the networks or 
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departments representing the organizations and employees as dynamic in nature.  These 
findings are positive given the electronic record and the data collected through the record 
are constantly transforming.  Health information exchange is on the forefront of 
advancing communications between clinicians and organizations to improve patient care 
while tracking patients and identities (Crawford, 2014).  These types of health 
intelligence will continue to increase as data driven care continues.  Security 
requirements will continue to increase as this field grows. 
Administrative and management oversight is important in the leadership of 
employee engagement with IT security.  Alshaikh, Ahmad, Maynard, and Chang (2014) 
conducted a review of management activity related to security that was in the literature.  
The authors reviewed 284 academic papers and 192 test books to develop a preliminary 
taxonomy.  The findings of the study included organizations policy management 
strategies of building a security team, which may include a security manager, to (a) 
implement and manage security, (b) manage information security risk, (c) develop 
employee security awareness, (d) maintain documentation of technical controls, and (e) 
act as an organizational liaison.  The findings from the taxonomy included within each of 
the practice areas a guide for assessment, development, implementation, evaluation, and 
sustainability.  Alshaikh et al. discussed in future research that by omission the literature 
did not differentiate practices into managerial or technical categories.  The findings, from 
the review of organizations with a security team, were positive of which became helpful 
to the users. 
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Understanding the benchmarks presented in the literature along with best 
practices identified in case studies related to the administrative and IT oversight the 
importance of employee engagement related to IT security is evident.  This is the 
foundation for understanding the connection made between the RN role and security 
compliance.  Applying this literature built a foundation for identifying the construct of 
Performance Expectancy and understanding how it plays a role in the RNs usage of the 
security practices.  According to Venkatesh et al. (2003) within the construct of 
performance expectancy, the users find the systems to be useful in their job and helpful in 
improving overall productivity. 
IT Security 
IT security, in general, has a great wealth of information with vast literature 
available.  Exploration of that literature with application to the health IT security may be 
of some benefit.  Many of the organizations find similarity in culture, employees, system 
management, regulatory compliance, and straddling new technology and approaches to 
challenges.  Often organizations implement compliance regulations with the intent that all 
will be perfect, and it just does not work.  There is much more to the story of regulation 
and as Kwon and Johnson (2012) points out in his work, there is no correlation between 
individual measures and breach performance thus there is no guarantee to security 
performance. 
Technical aspects of IT security include managing software and hardware, 
devices communications, wireless, intranet, internet, and system access technologies.  
Identity management is one example of a system that is managed by IT security.  Single 
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sign-on, an identity management system that allows for authentication to multiple 
applications, is widely used in corporate environments.  Milenković et al. discuss that the 
identity management system solves the problem of users having to create and remember 
multiple passwords that would most likely cause the creation of insecure passwords, 
forgetting passwords, or wasting time with multiple authentications.  Organizations 
overseeing the authentication process must consider the system use for the single sign-on 
authentication.  All users with multiple applications will most likely use the functionality 
creating desired participation and required security oversight.  Password and biometric 
authentication are both methods of gaining access to systems securely.  Li, Wen, Li, 
Zhang, and Jin (2014) discuss that the biometric authentication scheme protects 
information security and privacy. 
Practices that improve culture must involve the employees and organizational 
stakeholders to change security culture alike (Gaunt, 2000, & Kwon & Johnson, 2014).  
The culture of an organization influences responses to IT security.  Kwon and Johnson 
(2014) demonstrated in his work that there were three levels of security practice adoption 
based on culture, leaders, followers, and laggers.  Those identified organizations noted as 
leaders were training and managing risk and breach incidents. 
Human factors are frequently mentioned in the literature when discussing IT 
security and often through history have been referred to as the weakest link (Arce, 2003, 
Tam et al., 2010, and Ferguson et al., 2011).  Kwon and Johnson (2014) discuss that the 
healthcare industry faces two weak links the internal threat and the external threat.  
Because healthcare has not adequately ramped up to deal with the security risks through 
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investment, remainders exist of uncertainty related to coping with the two weak links.  
Evaluating and managing the human factors is one of the key aspects of IT security.  
Negligence is often cited as a human factor that affects the organization.  Negligence can 
fall into several categories of security risk.  Kruger and Anschutz (2013) discussed the 
insider negligence at the root of data breaches.  They discussed the false sense of security 
that everyone inside is safe but outsiders find ways in and not all insiders are honest 
(Kruger & Anschutz, 2013).  Security related behavior is an ever-pressing topic related to 
overall IT security.  The employees’ behavior must be reviewed and understood within 
the organization so that there is an opportunity to delineate risk behaviors.  Once 
delineated, the behavior must be addressed in a manner that will be corrective.  A vigilant 
program will increase employee IT security awareness. 
Nurses Awareness of Security 
Review of the literature revealed the limited field of work written related to 
awareness of IT security by the end user.  Most of the employee IT awareness 
information is imbedded in the IT education and IT policy literature or is inferred within 
implementation of IT project literature.  Documentation in the literature about the 
knowledge of handling IT security is limited.  As the focus narrows toward IT awareness 
of nurses, the literature available is increasingly sparse.  Direct awareness of IT security 
is often targeting the nurses’ awareness and concern for privacy during the use of 
technology in regards to communicating patient information.  In studying factors 
effecting compliance of IT security, Harris and Furnell (2012) discuss that the employees 
of organizations have been found to have only moderate to low awareness when asked 
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about behaviors required for security compliance.  Albarrak (2012) who studied the 
population of nurses identified that the nurses were deficient in security awareness and 
the importance of overall IT security in relation to patient data.  However, Albarrak was 
able to identify that the nurses had a 92% awareness of the need for password 
authentication when accessing the electronic system for patient information.  Harris and 
Furnell (2012) and Albarrak’s (2012) findings are both contrary to what Koivunen, 
Niemi, and Hupli (2014) identified in their study of nursing professional’s experience 
using communication devices in that nurses had a concern for information security during 
the use of such devices and expressed awareness as they relayed barriers of use.  There 
was no description within any of the three studies as to the reason for the state of IT 
security awareness.  One may be able to consider the point of evaluation for awareness as 
the study that identified IT security awareness involved devices that were used with 
points of contact and consideration in the midst of patient information sharing as opposed 
to initiating and ending a session for access to a system. 
Insight into human behavior and intention gives clues to awareness as described 
by Yoon and Kim (2013) and reveals employee characteristics maintaining IT security.  
Within their study, the findings described that behavioral intention is a key variable in IT 
security awareness.  Discussion included that the individuals’ beliefs of protection from 
being part of an organization that provides security is important to maintaining security.  
Ifinedo (2012) discussed that the by holding a regular IT security awareness campaign 
managers will increase presence with the employees and be shaping the future security 
behaviors of the employees. 
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Policy and Penalty 
Literature from Simpson (1996), Gaunt (2000), and others more than 15 years 
ago, identified the lack of personal and professional responsibility by users to follow 
policies for information and system IT security.  The following education and policy 
literature review covers aspects of organizational and employee response and interaction 
to IT security policy, strengthening of policy and procedure within the healthcare 
organization, IT involvement in education and policy, and recommendations made for the 
education and consequence of staff associated with IT security measures. 
Simpson (1996) discussed that a lack of policy and procedure, education, and 
oversight from leadership within the organizations allows for breaches in the security.  IT 
leadership, healthcare organizations, and orientation programs have made strong attempts 
to address many of the issues that Simpson had discussed in the 90’s.  Gaunt (2000) 
discussed the need for training to increase awareness.  There are many aspects to security 
policy compliance related to the human factor with one of the first being awareness 
(Belanger, 2011; Renaud, & Goucher, 2012; Vance, Lowry, & Eggett, (2013); & Barlow, 
Warkentin, Ormond, & Dennis, (2013).  An employee must first be aware of a policy 
before being able to follow that policy.  Renaud and Goucher (2012) reaffirm that it is 
unlikely that the employees will read policies without encouragement, so it takes 
management interaction, education, and oversight to assure that the employee gets the 




Belanger (2011) found that attitudes regarding policy implementation for security 
were not affected based on knowledge of consequence even if there was a known 
consequence and the breach was severe.  A secondary finding revealed that technical 
competence had a relationship to a decrease in policy enhancement, which Belanger 
concluded might be due to the mandatory aspects of change thus impacting pride.  When 
mandatory processes are implemented, the individual is placed in a challenged position 
and with competence being questioned a negative attitude may develop. 
Through the years, many different strategies have risen as implementation 
solutions for organizations including one of consequence.  Consequences causing 
workforce employee fear of not following the rules is an effective measure of successful 
implementation as reported by Workman, Bommer, and Straub, (2009).  In a field, study 
focused on individual and organizational factors Workman et al. (2009) used survey and 
observation to gather data and conduct an analysis of that data using exploratory factor 
analysis.  The factor analysis led to high congruence between the self-reported data and 
the observation data thus z-score was applied.  Predictive amplification of procedural 
justice was applied to all hypotheses in the study resulting in a conclusion that the 
security focus was on either the individual or the organization factors but not on both.  
When individuals believe the threat is high and is directly expected to influence them 
personally, they will respond by supporting policy much more than if the threat is 
perceived as distant.  Findings related to procedural justice were important in this study 
when the organizational processes supported justice related to employee concerns or 
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grievances and management addressed them there was a 20% increase in security 
behaviors. 
Guo, Yuan, Archer, and Connelly (2011) identified that misuse of organizational 
information security policies without malicious intent to cause harm is the definition of a 
non-malicious security violation.  Based on this definition, Guo (2013) identified 
behaviors of security violation that include (a) intentional, (b) nonmalicious self-
benefitting, (c) voluntary rule breaking, and (d) possibly causing damage or security risk.  
Considering each of these behaviors as undesirable, Guo (2013) discusses the 
multifaceted approaches to the resolution of security risk.  He suggests additional 
literature including deterrence with a focus on prevention, punishment, contingency 
factors, neutralization, and relative advantage in job performance. 
Yoon and Kim (2013) examined the practices of 162 employees of Korean 
organizations to identify a model for analyzing employees’ workplace related computer 
security behaviors.  Yoon and Kim identified that the moral obligation and attitude 
toward computer security are predictors of individual employee’s intention to practice 
computer security behavior.  The identified model aligns with the UTAUT model as it 
prescribes similar tracts leading to behavior and use.  Interestingly, this study brought the 
concept of moral obligation into the realm of a security behavior rather than an ethical 
issue, which allowed this examination to take place as a self-control measure.   This 
measure of moral obligation contributed to the social norms as a positive deviant to 
security behavior.  Ifinedo (2014) suggested in the findings from his study that 
management providing atmospheres where employees could share organizational values 
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through socialization with fellow workers could increase security compliance.  
Gajanayake, Shame, and Lane (2013) described an information accountability system that 
allows for minimizing risk if the proper governmental regulations are in place.  This is 
done through instruments of measuring evaluation of protocol coupled with user context.  
It is based on user awareness and actual user adoption.  Gajanayake et al. (2013) 
evaluated this method of accountability on an eHealth system allowing for the variance of 
healthcare information, personnel, and patients. 
Agaku, Adisa, Ayo-Yusuf, and Connolly (2014), Kim, Yang, and Park (2014), 
and Umphress, and Bingham (2011) each discussed the behavioral aspects of employee 
compliance with security policy and organizational protocol providing varying reasons 
for behaviors.  Agaku et al. (2014) identified that employees are willing to take measures 
of security with protected health information but do not easily make the connection to 
other security measures that encompass and protect the system housing the patient’s 
medical records.  Kim et al. (2014) demonstrated that there is a relationship between the 
belief of security policy effectiveness and policy compliance, thus the higher the trust in 
the security policy the higher compliance with the policy.  Conversely, Umphress and 
Bingham (2011) identified that there may be developed unethical pro-organizational 
behavior that influences culture in which the employees believe they are protecting the 
organization by purposefully violating the policies.  Because the actions are seen as 
protecting the organization it is overlooked and becomes a cultural norm.  These 
unethical acts although violating policy and procedure are seen as doing bad for good 
reasons by the employee and the employment social group with outcomes that lead to 
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risk.  The relationships are complex and warrant further research.  This concept of 
neutralization is violating policy but believing it is for the good of the organization is 
justifying the reason for violation of policy.  The justification or rationalization may 
occur in many forms as the employee moves through the process of violation.  Barlow et 
al. (2013), Kim et al. (2014), and Umphress and Bingham (2014) all concluded that 
neutralization is prevalent with in the employee base and requires training to raise 
awareness.  Barlow et al. (2013) discussed that based on neutralization, employees will 
violate policies even with the knowledge that there are deterrent policies in place 
suggesting that they rationalize the deterrence consequence.  Healthcare providers often 
justify the work they do finding applications to patient care.  Thus, neutralization may be 
a plausible application to the clinical personnel when applying security principles to the 
clinical workflow. 
Agaku et al. (2014), Kim et al. (2014), Yoon et al. (2013), and Umphress and 
Bingham (2011) all subscribed to the necessity of training for information security so that 
when the employee is faced with the security situation, no questions arise, the process of 
knowing what and how to take measures of protecting the system is second nature.  In 
this situation, the employee knows the policy, has practiced, and will be without a risk of 
security breach.  Training includes basic security knowledge, policy awareness, 
neutralization awareness, and communication methods (Barlow et al., 2013, and Renaud 
et al., 2012).  The education and communication processes are foundational knowledge 
for the implementation and sustainment of policy and protocol knowledge related to 
information security.  Barlow et al. (2013) and Kim et al. (2014) discouraged 
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neutralization to reduce IT policy violation.  Although the education is not a single factor 
of success toward security maintenance, it is required so that there is a basic level of 
understanding by employees for performance expectation.  Several methods of 
communicating basic knowledge including policy introduction to employees at the point 
of entry to the organization on orientation is accomplished during the following; annual 
competency review periods, information review of policies, and during regular 
communication rollouts within the organization.  Once provided education reaches the 
employees’, engagement in the security process is elicited and is best incorporated into 
the performance expectation.  Vance, Lowry, and Eggett (2013) recommend 
accountability processes for the reduction of access policy violations.  Within the study, 
(a) monitoring awareness, (b) auditing, (c) engaging in approved actions, and (d) 
emulating social presence were four aspects of positive influence toward accountability 
(Vance et al., 2013).  Accountability means that the employee is responsible for the 
security but they must also be empowered to care for the security of the organization, 
meaning they need to have the correct knowledge and tools.  If the employees can view 
the responsibility of security as shared, they will adjust along with management staff 
when supported to appropriately uphold the security efforts of the organization (Renauld 
et al., 2012). 
Another look at consequences for human motivation related to rule following in 
the realm of information security is punishment or reward.  Son (2011) and Ifinedo 
(2012) explored variables of intrinsic motivation and motivation theory and how they 
relate to security compliance.  In contrast, Harris and Furnell (2012) explored shaming 
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and the impact that it had on behavior and awareness toward security compliance.  
Shaming was found to be impactful because it outweighed the act itself and the employee 
was aware of the wrongdoing.  If the employee was not aware of the wrongdoing, then 
the shaming was not effective and created a negative perception of IT.  The negative 
perception of IT becomes counterproductive to the efforts of building relationships and 
communication pathways.  The most concerning and severe report of shaming by the 
employees was when an employee’ name and a photo was placed publicly for the rest of 
the peer group to see.  An example given was a posting within the break room.  The 
employees felt as though the shaming sanctions were harsh and they did respond but 
Harris and Furnell (2012) cautioned that the risks of alienating staff from information 
security staff and ideas might be detrimental to overall efforts.  The study by Son (2011) 
demonstrated that there is a lack of attention toward the intrinsic motivation of human 
behavior.  Provided managers connect with internal values of employees, stronger 
connections toward security compliance would occur.  Ultimately, alienation through 
shaming would not be the ideal in creating connections. 
Leaders and top management in the organization are individuals that influence the 
cycle of information security compliance.  Hu, Dinev, Hart, and Cooke (2012) explored 
the aspects of leadership, culture of the organization, and the employee behavior.  The 
findings included that the top management has a critical role significantly affecting the 
organizational culture and employee beliefs.  Organizational culture has a significant 
effect on employee attitudes.  It is important that top management is helping to form the 
culture of security for and along with the employee.  Box and Pottas (2013) suggested 
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that the actions must be taken to promote positive attitudes along with the policy 
implementations toward IT security behavior.  This will only be accomplished through 
the motivational properties of emotion. 
Facilitating Conditions as perceived by the RN, include the technical methods that 
support the RN in using the security practices.  Within the construct of facilitating 
conditions, the user believes they have resources and knowledge required to use the 
system, they determine if it is compatible with other systems that they use, and they have 
someone to assist them when needed (Venkatesh et al., 2003).  Within this study, 
exploration of RN perceptions of security practice facilitation through the conditions of 
technical approaches is expected to have a direct correlation. 
Throughout this section of security related policy and associated behaviors, the 
patterns of password management by employees and risk of breach are additional areas of 
literature that impact the foundational work for this study in framing the business 
problem.  Compliance with the security practice continues to be anecdotally reported in 
the popular business and healthcare literature and captured along with the reports of the 
security breaches as they occur.  The business management problem continues to exist 
because there is a lack of research and insight into how breaches and violations of the 
security occur. 
Password Management 
Maintaining the security of the IT system within any organization must focus on 
the employees who access the system.  Protecting access to the system is most frequently 
accomplished through password authentication (Albarrak, 2012; Belanger, 2011; Cazier 
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& Medlin, 2006; Rajarajan, Prabhu, Palanivel, & Karthikeyan, 2014; Sharma, & 
Sugumaran, 2011; and Tam, Glassman, & Vandenwauver, 2010).  From an 
organizational perspective, the IT system is composed of three parts, technology, 
management, and the people (Cheng, Li, Li, Holm, & Zhai, 2013).  The people or 
employees remain the weakest link in security and password management even though 
there have been strides in technology systems (Medlin et al., 2008; & Tam et al., 2010).  
According to Sharma and Sugumaran (2011) a clear understanding of the asset and the 
value of such asset is required for a company to create the policies and changes around 
the process to ensure adequate security including employee practices.  A review of 
literature related to password practices is presented in this section and demonstrates the 
interrelatedness to behaviors or violations of IT security literature. 
Reviewing the history of passwords, Cheswick (2013) discusses the Green Book 
that the U.S. government published in the 1980’s providing advice for passwords and 
avoiding threats against technology.  Cheswick (2013) makes comparisons from the 
1980’s with today identifying how the paradigm has shifted noting that there are very 
different password creation methods for protecting the security.  An example provided is 
that in the 1980’s it was a general rule of thumb not to ever write a password down but to 
create a password you would remember because the threat was that someone at the office 
or in your desk area was the threat of theft.  Today the threat is remote and can access the 
computer system from miles or countries away so creating a strong password that you 
may not remember except for writing it down is much less of a threat.  Cheswick (2013) 
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suggests ways to remember the password by writing phrases that will help you remember 
it without actually writing the password down thus making it even more secure. 
Measures to protect IT security involve a vast array of security aspects, which 
include the hardware and software applications used by employees (Crazier et al. 2006; 
Medlin et al., 2008, & Rajarajan et al., 2014).  Even though the aspects associated with 
security fall within the scope of IT security, they require operational management and 
oversight.  One particular measure of the security management in healthcare is the 
maintenance of password confidentiality and security (Cazier & Medlin, 2006, and 
Medlin et al., 2008). 
To understand the population of employees that will be included in this study, a 
brief summary is provided here.  There are 3,972,327 professionally active registered 
nurses in the U.S. (KFF, 2015).  According to Charles, Gabriel, and Furukawa (2014, 
May) there are currently 94% of hospitals with basic electronic health record adoption 
and 59.4% with certified electronic health record adoption.  Between 2008 and 2014, 
there has been a two-fold increase in electronic health record adoption by office-based 
physicians (ONC, 2015).  Provided the governmental incentives described earlier remain 
in place these numbers will continue to rise creating few environments remaining for a 
nurse to practice without accessing an electronic medical record and IT system.  Within 
the workforce of healthcare today, 37.4% of all hospital labor costs are comprised of RN 
labor (Welton, 2011).  Because the employee base is comprised of a large portion of RNs 
who are using the technology applications for multiple purposes, it is important to 
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identify their knowledge related to the implications and consequences of the security risk 
and breach. 
Albarrak (2012), Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015), and Medlin et al. (2008) 
identified that the behaviors associated with password practices allowed for password 
sharing.  Albarrak (2012) identified that nurses mishandled the passwords through 
sharing their information, exchanging the passwords, and ignoring the need for the 
password resets.  Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015) discussed that sharing of passwords 
among healthcare employees who responded to the password security questions identified 
that they shared passwords.  A review of security scoring was done to evaluate 
relationships between education level, work experience, professional category, and 
gender of which none were significant for the sharing of passwords.  Medlin et al. (2008) 
concluded that the employees did not view the IT security aspect of password 
management as important.  Albarrak (2012) reported the password sharing at a rate of 
33%, Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015) at a rate of 31.7 %, and Medlin et al. (2008) at a 
rate of 73%.  In these three studies, sharing of passwords occurred with coworkers or 
colleagues and friends of their coworkers.  Reasons for sharing were not described. 
Developing and managing a password was discussed by Albarrak (2012), 
Belanger (2011), and Medlin et al. (2008) identifying that users had knowledge of how to 
create a strong password but did not choose to do so when an easier to remember 
alternative could be used.  Belanger (2011) described this user preference as “ease of 
use”.  This path of ease is the avenue that most users will default toward when 
developing their passwords if left to their own devices.  Medlin et al. (2008) identifies 
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that memorization of passwords is not practical or effective as the short-term memory is 
not capable of holding such if it is correctly crafted.  Often the lack of ability to 
memorize the difficult password is what leads to the easy password creating those that are 
then easy to guess making the system vulnerable to risk. Medlin et al. (2008) identified 
that most users’ passwords fell into four primary categories that were previously defined, 
Family, Fan, Fantasists, Cryptic and the four expanded groups of Other, Faith, Place, and 
Numbers.  The password categories are each briefly defined in Figure 2. 
 
Category Definition 
Family Name or nickname, name of child, partner or pet, birthday 
Fan Names of athletes, singers, movie stars, fictional characters or sports 
teams 
Fantasists Evidence of sex is evident in passwords such as “sexy” “stud” and 
“goddess” 
Cryptic Unintelligible passwords or a random string of letters, numbers and 
symbols 
Other Common English dictionary terms that did not include religious terms or 
places 
Faith Terms associated with religion or religious terms or places 
Place Names associated with towns or cities 
Numbers A string of all numbers 
 
Figure 2. Primary and expanded password categories and definitions.  Adapted from 
Analyzing the vulnerability of U.S. hospitals to social engineering attacks: How many of 
your employees would share their password?  by Medlin, B., Cazier, J., & Foulk, D. 
(2008). International Journal of Information Security and Privacy, 2(3), p. 74-75. 
 
Medlin et al., (2008) did make a correlation in findings that those who made 
stronger passwords were less willing to share their passwords (29%) than those who 
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included family in the password who were willing to share at 60% and those who 
included numbers at 50%.  Along with categories of password creation findings of 
password strength or complexity is identified.  According to Crazier et al. (2006), the 
password should be complex to create the secure environment and maintain the password 
as the protective gatekeeper to the patient information.  The complex password definition 
includes a combination of at least eight characters with a mix of upper and lower case 
letters and at least one special character (Crazier et al., 2006).  Tam et al. (2010) 
identified that even if there was intent to create a complex password it does not lead to a 
password that is better.  Albarrak (2012) had no nurse create a strong password that 
would meet the definition of complex.  Another issue that Albarrak (2012) explored with 
nurses was them changing the password once they were aware that others knew the 
password and 54% responded that they would not.  Along with the previous concerns of 
password management, a paralleled aspect of security management is computer log-off.  
Albarrak (2012) identified that 16% of the nurses studied did not log off of the system 
they were working with, allowing for others to access confidential information under 
their authentication, again representing a lack of understanding or connection with IT 
security. 
Tam et al. (2010) and Cheswick (2013) discussed that the issues surrounding 
password management are related to the human factors and that people will trade 
convenience for the security.  Even though password knowledge is present, Tam et al. 
found that users were more concerned about family and friends gaining information than 
that threat of hacking or identity theft.  Tam et al.’s (2010) findings regarding password 
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selection showed that users were able to understand a passwords quality but often chose a 
weak password because it was more convenient basing this on the concept of the 
influence of a near event versus the likelihood of a future event.  The example provided is 
the protection from a future event such as identity theft versus the current event 
remembering my password (Tam et al., 2010). 
Social Influence is the method by which the RN perceives others, such as their 
peers or significant other important professionals in the clinical environment, believe they 
should be using the security practices.  Within the construct of social influence, the user 
believes that their use of the system is influential to others and others that are important 
think that it should be used, the business leaders believe it should be used, and the 
organization supports the system use (Venkatesh et al., 2003).  Within this study, the RN 
perceptions of social influence are an important aspect within the clinical setting related 
to varying levels of social support that may or may not permit sharing of passwords, 
mishandling of passwords, and other security issues such as no log-off. 
Workflow 
In an examination of the workflow of those employees that work directly with the 
patient population in acute healthcare settings and those that support them in the work 
that they perform, all employees have a responsibility to maintain IT security within the 
scope of the work duties (Renaud, & Goucher, 2012).  Several themes and 
recommendations related to the workflow were present in the literature.  
Recommendation for structure and system enhancement of the workflow and 
environment presented a potential resolution of current issues and continuing errors 
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(Alsalamah, Gray, Hilton, & Alsalamah, 2013, Kraemer & Carayon, 2006, and 
Schwartze, Haarbrandt, Formeier, Haux, & Seidel, 2014).  Alsalamah et al. (2013) 
discussed the aspect of patient-centered care, collaboration, and decision-making and the 
impact of the workflow on the medical information following an observational 
methodology study that analyzed cancer pathways.  The study focused on the legacy 
systems with case management as the population.  Findings from the observation 
revealed the need for open information creating a difficult situation for maintaining 
security.  Alsalamah et al. identified six themes necessary for security; (a) Role-based 
access control, need to know basis for access to information; (b) Fine-grained access 
control, different positions gain varying levels of access to information; (c) Circle of 
trust, allowing members with specific levels of access to gain emergent access in specific 
circumstances “breaking the glass” (p. 814); (d) Persistent control, continually maintain 
the ability to track information flow by user throughout the life of the records; (e) 
Dynamic control,  the ability to change security and protection levels; and (f) Human-
level policy awareness, share policies with users related to level of access and protection.  
Schwartze et al. (2014) conducted research to find an applicable authentication method 
for clinical workflows through a systematic literature review.  Within this literature 
review, Schwatze et al. (2014) identified that the system and the user allowed for risk 
when focused on the clinical requirements specific to workflow.  An example of 
workflow concern is the login sessions that were not logged out allowing for another to 
gain access.  This lack of logging out, either intentional or unintentional is both a system 
and user issue but not readily resolved by any additional security implementation.  In all 
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cases of plans for correction, this is nothing more than adding security to an insecure 
workflow.  The conclusion reached within this review was that the username and 
password combination is the most practical and secure authentication solution in the 
clinical workflow process (Schwatze et al., 2014). 
Each clinical discipline has a workflow that is unique unto itself including tasks 
and interventions based on knowledge and expertise within their field of clinical practice.  
The clinical workflow for the RN includes each of the following:  The pattern of RN 
work in time and motion as it relates to (a) patient care, assessment, medication 
administration, patient information communication and documentation, (b) charge nurse 
and preceptor duties, (c) incorporation of clinical devices and technology including the 
electronic medical record, and (d) other work of the clinical environment as carried out 
by the RN as part of an assignment responsibility according to policy and procedure or 
protocol / practice (Kashiwagi, Sexton, Graves, Johnson, Callies, Roger, & Thompson, 
2016, Koloroutis, 2004, and Zheng, Haftel, Hirschl, O'Reilly, & Hanauer, 2010).  While 
employees have IT security aspects within the scope of responsibility for their profession 
and job descriptions, it is identified in the literature that they do not identify a working 
implementation of that responsibility within the workflow of the duties they perform. 
Gunawan (2016) discussed the basic concepts to electronic health records being used in 
nursing practice and the attributes such as ease of use, user friendly, and good 
performance coinciding with the workflow.  Workarounds are a possible outcome of 
technology implementation and was identified by Rack, Dudjak, and Wolf (2012), who 
concluded that it should be easier to use the technology that is being implemented than to 
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develop a workaround.  The environment and work should support the technology 
implementation.  Zafar, Ko, and Clark, (2014) in a healthcare case study discussed that 
the clinical staff does not see the IT security as being part of the clinical work.  They 
identify that the clinical staff were busy with clinical patient care and duties related to 
patient management thus maintaining a perception of the IT security being separate, 
different, and nonclinical.  This qualitative study identified many issues of IT security 
within the clinical workflow that inhibit the process of accurate use and inclusion of IT 
security.  The perception of the clinical professionals was that they did not have time to 
incorporate or “worry about” the IT security (Zafar et al., 2014, p. 743).  Zafar et al. 
(2014) discussed the importance of executive management support and empowerment of 
the team so that IT security becomes a part of the workflow.  Engagement of leadership 
within the organization is critical. 
Clinical leadership, decision making, and overall success of the healthcare 
institution is determined at the executive level by a group of individuals, the Chief 
Medical Officer (CMO), the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and the Chief Nursing 
Officer (CNO).  This group must work closely with the Chief Information Officer (CIO) 
and the Chief Nursing Information Officer (CNIO) to coordinate the electronic medical 
record and data maintenance of the organization.  The CNO and CNIO work in close 
collaboration with all levels of nursing leadership including the informatics teams and 
clinical departments to ensure proper flow, management, usage, and functionality are 
conducted.  The CNO and CNIO also work closely with the CMO, CIO, and CEO to 
ensure and maintain accountability for the organization as being financially responsible 
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for the care provided, the technology used, and patient outcomes (Hebda, & Czar, 2013; 
Hovenga, & Grain, 2013).  Leaders are responsible for creating change but in particular 
the nursing leader creates a platform for change in nursing practice.  Salmela, Eriksson, 
and Fagerstrom (2012) reported that the knowledge of nurse leadership methods of 
leading change is through relating, translating, and transforming practice by the roles they 
play in the change processes.  Change requires a continuous learning and reshaping 
within the organizational culture.  Thought patterns restructuring, reshaping of ideas, and 
movement of change in opinion and value is the basis for the creation of genuine change.  
Change becomes important as implementation and sustainment of IT security are at the 
forefront of leadership and organizational goals. 
Nurse executives are also prepared in the knowledge of nursing operation at the 
bedside and in the strategic vision of the healthcare system while moving the informatics 
implementation into the clinical environment to foster the best patient care and outcome.  
The nurse executive has to conceptually and operationally know both sides, the clinical 
plan of bedside care and the vision of the organizational mission, vision, and goals.  They 
become the most knowledgeable of the executive leadership team from a global 
perspective when integrating informatics within the institution.  Sockolow, Rogers, 
Bowles, Hand, and George (2014) discussed many of the important facets of nurse 
executive’s communications and considerations for implementation and maintenance of 
technology and software to assure success.  They describe the nurse executive role as 
critical to interacting with the nurse in decision making and using evidence based systems 
to combat hurdles faced with technology.  One of the nurse executive competencies is 
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that they are a to be a progressive thinker who can predict and/or anticipate the future of 
nursing practice and the needs that come along with the transitions in practice; this places 
them in the category of an early adopter of the electronic record and other devices within 
the healthcare world.  As a nurse leader founder of nursing and the first nurse executive, 
Florence Nightingale documented patient care to track a patient’s progress (Kirby, 2015).  
During the Crimean War, Florence Nightingale considered the patients’ needs, projected 
the best way to meet those needs, and recorded them in patient notes. 
Effort Expectancy is associated with how easy it is to use the security practices.  
Ease of use is determined within the workflow.  Within the construct of effort 
expectancy, the user finds the system to help with clear communication, improve system 
skill, create ease of system use and make learning easy (Venkatesh et al., 2003).  When 
IT security is part of the workflow and is helpful to clinical care employees are more 
likely to include the associated behaviors required to carry the security measures out 
fully. 
Risk and Breach 
Organizational protection and overall risk management are impacted by the level 
of security maintenance by every employee.  Behaviors that are employed with the use of 
passwords and the security practices may correlate with the description by Kruger and 
Anschutz (2013) discussing the access to the electronic patient health information gained 
either maliciously or nonmaliciously within the organizations.  These behaviors and 
variant accessing of systems as described may be one cause for healthcare to be leading 
in data breaches as recorded in 2011 among the top 10 industries (Kruger & Anschutz, 
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2013).  IT improvements help to create major advances in the healthcare sector providing 
improved quality with advances in medical science and reductions in costs, but the down 
side is increased violation of the security and privacy (Appari & Johnson 2010).  
Healthcare organizations are increasingly becoming the targets of hacking in the same 
manner as sought after personal information.  Public awareness and concern of hacking 
are becoming more prominent (Kwon & Johnson, 2014). 
The majority of this section will focus on the threat of a system breach due to an 
unauthorized access of the system or an intrusion of some type to gain information 
without permissions.  I would, however, be remiss if I did not mention the concept of 
systemic threat that some patients experience.  According to Appari and Johnson, (2010) 
the systemic threat is a threat to patient privacy from those within the organization who 
are legally accessing the information and using it to the patient’s detriment.  Examples of 
systemic threat include using medical information to deny health or life insurance, deny 
employment, or creating other burdensome financial hardships (Appari & Johnson 2010).  
Although this threat exists, the focus of threat for the purpose of this literature review will 
be toward a security breach. 
Employee awareness of policy related to IT security is an important aspect of 
organizational IT security and protection from a breach.  There is a great deal of literature 
related to IT security policy implementation and compliance yet there is little agreement 
in the literature about what creates compliance and overall organizational security.  IT 
security policy awareness is the individual awareness of the consequences of failing to 
comply with the organizational security policies (Rotvold, 2008).  Security practice is the 
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behavior the nurses use to maintain the security or not, by properly authenticating and 
maintaining the security of their accounts to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of data (Chopra, 2013).  Security risk is influenced by the security practice 
and is defined as a threat that the password privacy or another access to the account has 
exposure of a kind including a violation during use due to deviation from policy, 
protocol, or practice, that has allowed for the threat of harm potentially rendering the 
system no longer secure (Rotvold, 2008).  This process of security deviation allows for 
breach and renders the organizations system vulnerable to breach from the inside. 
The average breach, usually tracked to an insider rather than a malicious hacker, 
costs an organization approximately $6 million or more for each incident according to the 
Ponemon Institute (“Cyber Attacks”, 2015 & “State of Cybersecurity”, 2015).  After a 
surge in healthcare breaches that creates exposure of data for millions of patients, the cost 
was reported for 2014 by Eddy (2014) to be $5.6 Billion and currently after a five-year 
study is now reported to cost over $6 Billion (“Cyber Attacks”, 2015).  Personal 
information security has become progressively more important with increased public 
awareness that has been heightened for multiple reasons including increased reporting 
within the public-sector news reports.  People are more affected than ever with numbers 
increasing over five years from 1.4 to 2.3 million adult victims of medical identity theft 
(“Cyber Attacks”, 2015).  The investigative report published by O'Harrow (2012) 
identified the many vulnerabilities of IT security occurring within the healthcare industry.  
These included password mishandling, insecure practices, known security access issues 
that were left unaddressed and wireless device access points that were insecure leaving 
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the organization open for risk of security breach or inappropriate access to the system.  
Ponemon Institute reports in their whitepapers that the top reasons for healthcare breach 
remain employee negligence with lost and stolen devices (Eddy, 2014 & “Criminal 
Attacks”, 2015). 
Chopra (2013) discusses controls required for hospital security of which one 
category is technical and includes seven aspects, (a) filtering of web traffic, (b) e-mail 
server filters with removal of malicious attachments, (c) patching procedures or 
automatic patching, (d) anti-virus, (e) controlled PCs and hardware, (f) encrypted storage 
devices, and (g) restrictive firewalls.  If these measures are in place then the other 
measures such as support services for security access, technical controls to allow for 
access between groups, security teams dedicated to specific work and response, and 
management team members that are responsive to IT security will all supplement a 
successful security program (Chopra, 2013). 
With the recent hacking of Anthem, one of the United States largest Health 
Insurers, the American people are even more aware of vulnerabilities regarding personal 
information and health information (Abelson & Goldstein, 2015).  Information from 
approximately 80 million records was available to the hackers once they hacked into the 
Anthem system.  A phishing scam was used to access the credentials of five employees 
from Anthem as reported by Amerigroup, the operating company of Anthem (Balbi, 
2015).  Similar reports were reported by Verizon in the 2011 data breach experience 
where phishing emails were opened and malware infected the executives’ laptops 
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allowing access to the system (Baker, Goudie, Hutton, Hylender, Niemantsverdriet, 
Novak, & Ostertag et al., 2011). 
Access to health records is more desirable than gaining access to general credit 
accounts because the files from health records contain more information such as Social 
Security numbers, birth dates, addresses of the individual and significant others, 
employment information, emergency contact information, and other personal 
information.  A collection of such personal information allows for rapid high-level 
identity theft.  Finkle (2013) discussed that Dell Secure Works identified in a recent 
report that hackers can sell complete health insurance credentials for $20 per set of data 
as opposed to $1 to $2 for each credit card number with a security code in underground 
markets.  Because there is a rapid high return when monetized with great profit for health 
information over credit card data sets up to $20 or more as opposed to $1 to $2 when sold 
in the underground, a very strong interest in sales of this information creates.  The 
healthcare organizations are more inviting targets for hackers and social engineers 
because of the ease of breach and significant profitability.  Finkle also discussed the 
statements by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warning that healthcare remains 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
Healthcare costs in the United States were at 17.4 percent of the gross domestic 
product in 2013 according to the Medicare and Medicaid Services (2014).  These 
healthcare costs include the burden of technology costs, security, and breach recovery.  
The economic impact to the average organization costs $2,134,800 per organization 
based on a calculation of an average of five attacks annually (“Criminal Attacks”, 2015).  
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Most organizations report they are not confident they will be able to detect data losses in 
the event of a breach.  Response to security incidents is an obligation of the security 
management team within the organization.  Effective incident management is critical to 
the reduction of threat impact to an organization.  Ahmad, Hadgkiss, and Ruighaver 
(2012) identify that the response process consists of five main practices, namely 
“preparation for, identification, containment, the eradication and recovery from 
incidents” (p. 643). Improvements in process related to the IT security in the healthcare 
arena would allow for a potential impact of cost reduction, patient safety, and patient 
satisfaction.  Provided the employees were engaged within each of the four constructs 
that lead to use behavior the resulting change in security protection would ultimately 
position healthcare for cost reductions as a result of the decreased breach and risk.  
Agaku et al. concluded that increased strategies are calling for higher security for the 
protected health information so that the trust of the information security will not be 
undermined any further.  Recent public reports of security breaches within the healthcare 
insurance companies’ serve to continue the media surge that will raise general citizen 
concern that hospitals are more at risk causing lack of confidence.  The general public is 
concerned with privacy and their general security of the information.  The Federal 
Governments Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Human Services reports that 
over the last five years there were 740 major security breaches within healthcare that 
affected 29 million people (Abelson & Goldstein, 2015).  Increasing the security within 
the healthcare organizations creates a more confident feeling for patients individually and 
extends to the global public who become more comfortable.  Rapid and constant changes 
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within healthcare require a continual reassessment of security status (Chopra, 2013).  The 
work of identifying one population’s perception with gained insight and potential for 
improvement of the IT security behavior and handling of security practices may become 
the catalyst to some of the change that is needed in healthcare security processes related 
to IT management that will promote increased patient confidence. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, there has been an incorporation and presentation of review of the 
literature staging a foundational frame for this work.  An overview of the search and 
review of literature collection procedures were presented.  The conceptual framework 
was developed from the work of Rogers (2003 & 2004) through to the model of UTAUT 
(Venkatesh, 2003).  The four core constructs that influence behavioral intention to use 
technology within UTAUT have been highlighted for use and were discussed within the 
literature; they include (a) performance expectancy, (b) effort expectancy, (c) social 
influence, and (d) facilitating conditions.  A review of the supporting literature was 
conducted for each of the following categories, information security in healthcare, IT 
security, nurse awareness, policy and penalty, password management, workflow, and risk 
and breach. 
Connections to social change include increased knowledge and understanding of 
impacts to social change following the literature review.  With dramatic costs to 
healthcare organizations and 2.3 million adult victims of medical identity theft annually 
there is a place for change.  Moving into Chapter 3, I will discuss the research design, 
development of the tool, data collection methods, and methods for data analysis.  Chapter 
69 
 
4 will include the discussion of techniques used for analysis of the data and emerged 
findings in relationship to the research questions.  Chapter 5 will incorporate discussion 
of the areas for future research, implications to social change, and closing remarks. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of the 
RN within four of the constructs of the unified theory of acceptance and usage of 
technology (UTAUT) that are specific to use behavior (Venkatesh et al., 2003).  The 
experiences and perceptions of the registered nurse (RN) were analyzed as they related to 
the UTAUT constructs of performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, 
and facilitating conditions.  I formulated a research plan to conduct independent analysis 
as themes emerged within each construct.  The research methodology is set forth in 
Chapter 3. 
This chapter includes discussion of the research design that was used to conduct 
this study.  The role of the researcher, methodology, and the issues with trustworthiness 
are each included in the research design.  Within the methodology section a detailed 
review of participant selection, instrumentation, expert panel review, procedures for 
recruitment of the participants and their participation, data collection methods, and the 
data analysis plan are each discussed in detail.  Targeting the issue of trustworthiness for 
exploration to confirm the credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, and 
ethical procedures intended for use within the study procedures are reviewed. 
Research Design and Rationale 
In Chapter 2, the literature review provided a grounded base supporting the 
importance of maintaining information technology (IT) security and the behaviors 
associated with it that are essential to healthcare organizations.  The purpose of this 
qualitative case study was to explore how RNs perceive IT security behaviors in acute 
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care hospital settings based on the UTAUT constructs of performance expectancy, effort 
expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions.  I asked the following 
overarching research question for this study:  What are RNs’ perceptions, expressed 
intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT security? 
The following research questions were used to provide the supportive data 
designed to guide the work of this research using the four constructs of UTAUT that are 
consistent with behavioral intention and use behavior: 
RQ 1: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the performance expectancy of IT security practice? 
RQ 2: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the effort expectancy related to the IT security practice? 
RQ 3: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the social influence related to the IT security practice? 
RQ 4: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the facilitating conditions of the IT security practice? 
A qualitative case study design was used to determine the perceived experiences 
of the RNs recruited for this study.  Merriam (2014) discussed that the value of a 
qualitative study allows for the meaning of the problem being studied to be viewed within 
the research as the user sees, experiences, or understands his or her world.  The 
qualitative study allows for interviewing the employees of the organization thus 
providing insight into the RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported 
behaviors of the IT security and while using the constructs of UTAUT to guide the 
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research.  The qualitative case study with interviewing is a design more suited to this set 
of research questions as I was seeking information related to the perceptions, expressed 
intentions, and self-reported behaviors of the RN.  Each of these attributes was discussed 
in various themes that could be missed if other design methodologies would have been 
used. 
Other research designs available in the qualitative domain do not provide the 
same depth for rich exploration within the case review.  A phenomenological design 
would allow the gathering of information but would limit the view of the clinical aspect 
of interaction (Marshall & Rossman, 2016) one that is not optimal for the RN perception 
of the world.  The ethnographic design would have looked at the cultural behaviors 
according to Marshall and Rossman (2016) and that would not have fulfilled the research 
questions.  The grounded theory would be used to find a new discovery or underlying 
theory as described by Merriam (2014) and was not a correct fit for this work. 
Role of the Researcher 
As the researcher, interviewer, and observer, it was important to examine and be 
aware of personal experience and potential conceptual ideas already framed related to the 
planned research.  Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff (2012) discussed that it may be 
necessity to consider the development of controls measures by multiple contributors to 
avoid risk for bias based on individual tendency for word choice or item formation.  
Including other field experts in development along with a thorough examination of self-
perceptions is essential to a well-developed study. 
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The interest in IT security by RNs has intrigued me for as long as the electronic 
systems have been in place in the hospital setting.  I have been a manager who has dealt 
with the consequences of poor conduct in IT security practice and related outcomes that 
are impactful to the organization, patient, and employee.  In the past, I had believed 
managing staff who were noncompliant to comply with IT security in a hospital setting 
was unavoidable because the scope was so large and perhaps unmanageable.  As time has 
passed and technology, security systems, base knowledge, and employee training has 
improved there are known ways and best practices that lead to strongly secure 
environments in many industries.  Healthcare is not in line with other industries in the 
level of security connections with employees and, as this became evident through the 
literature, I became intent on exploring the RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and 
self-reported behaviors of IT security while practicing in the acute care hospital setting. 
My role as the researcher took place with RNs who were part of the Three Rivers 
Chapter AACN professional nursing organization and practiced in the clinical setting.  
My continuous interest in the research was maintained in two realms, doctoral research 
and nurse executive knowledge.  The recruitment of participants was targeted and criteria 
based with specific qualifications for inclusion.  The criteria that was used for inclusion 
served to eliminated the possibility of including any direct subordinates or RN employees 
who I have influence over employment. 
Methodology 
This research study was conducted as a qualitative case study in the Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania region.  Volunteers were recruited from a professional nursing organization 
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using criteria based selection for participation.  Interviewing methods for data collection, 
usage of NVivo v11 for data maintenance and analysis, and conducting relational 
application to UTAUT to operational findings were the procedural strategies used in this 
study and are described in this section.  
Setting 
The professional nursing organization Three Rivers Chapter of American 
Association of Critical Care Nurses (AACN) agreed to provide access to their 
membership.  I recruited potential candidates for interview from this professional 
organization.  The Three Rivers AACN had provided a letter of support (Appendix B) 
following IRB approval.  The Three Rivers Chapter AACN has many nursing members 
who participate in the Beacon Award and nurses are eager to participate in research.  I 
was hopeful that the keen interest to participate in research by the RNs related to Beacon 
would create an overzealous response to participate in this study.  The potential for strong 
interest in research was one additional reason for the need of selection criteria. 
Participant Selection Logic 
The population that was used for this study came from the membership of Three 
Rivers Chapter AACN.  The total membership includes 224 RNs from the Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania and the surrounding region.  Request for volunteer participation was made 
through email to membership contacts with an invitation to participate.  The invitation to 
participate outlined the specific criteria required for participation.  Identification of 
participants’ verification of meeting criteria was made at the point of initial contact with 
me based on a self-report of an RN role.  Participants who were selected self-reported to 
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be RNs who met the following inclusion criteria: They (a) were a member of the Three 
Rivers Chapter AACN, (b) worked full time in a clinical environment, (c) had been 
oriented to the work environment, (d) had authentication (sign on) had privileges to the 
electronic record in their work environment, (e) had access to the work policies and (f) 
were willing to participate in the study. 
The participants interested in the study were contacted for recruitment to this 
study by e-mail as the initial contact.  Access to the membership with contact information 
attainable through Three Rivers AACN membership contact list and provided to me by 
the individuals occurred once consented by the organizational administrative 
representative of the professional organization (Appendix B).  The initial contact to the 
potential participant included a cover letter that served as an invitation to participate 
including a description of the study intent and objectives with sample questions that 
would be included in the interview.  There was additional information for participation 
available if the individual wanted it.  The invitation to participate used to recruit 
participants for interview was submitted to the IRB.  The initial membership access and 
fliers were provided as the initial contact to individuals.  All follow-up communications 
were conducted once the relationship was formally established between me and the 
member. 
Participants were interviewed to a sample size of 20 with saturation reached.  
Saturation is defined as the time in the data collection process of the interviewing in 
which there are no new concepts being brought forth or considered absent from what has 
been being collected of those being interviewed (Fusch & Ness, 2015).  Face-to-face 
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interview methodology was used.  The interview is appropriate to understand the lived 
experience of the individuals by listening to their stories.  Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted for the purpose of obtaining data related to the particular phenomenon of this 
topic.  Seidman (2013) discussed that the interview allows an exploration of a potential 
emergence of new content and findings.  I expected to discover new findings.  The 
interview questions were posed in an unbiased manner using interview techniques that 
are specifically crafted to maintain uniformity and objectivity.  I maintained a neutral 
manner during the interview process allowing for active listening throughout each 
interview session.  Each interviewee was allowed the opportunity to answer all items and 
to provide any additional insight into the content matter of IT security behaviors. 
Informed Consent 
Informed consent was described within the cover letter requesting participation.  
Once the potential participant expressed interest, I met face-to-face with the potential 
candidate, explained the research and obtained informed consent.  Informed consent as 
described by Halse and Honey (2014) is the process of providing clear, well-defined, and 
truthful information about the research.  Informed consent is voluntary and must be 
provided of free will by the participants.  The informed consent must also address any 
potential for distress or discomfort (Halse & Honey, 2014).  I did discuss with 
participants that I would keep copies of the participants informed consent documentation.  
I then answered any questions that participants had by providing contact information.  
The participant received a copy of the informed consent document.  The prospective 
participant was provided my contact information and was encouraged to make contact 
77 
 
with any questions prior to or following our scheduled interview.  Participants were 
provided the opportunity to opt out or withdraw from the study up to the point of post 
transcription verification (member checking) and prior to data entry into NVivo. 
Instrumentation 
A scripted questionnaire was used for direction during the interview.  The 
questionnaire allowed me to remain on topic and unbiased without missing essential 
content, yet the open-ended questions allow the interviewee to answer with openness 
related to his or her lived experiences.  During each of the interviews, a basic audio 
recorder was used so that the interview could be transcribed following the interaction.  
Confidentiality of the interaction was discussed with the participant to allay any concerns 
prior to the use of the recorder. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
Recruitment for the study was voluntary and criteria based with self-reported 
verification.  The RNs who volunteered to participate in the study and met the criteria of 
being a member of the Three Rivers Chapter AACN, working full time in the clinical 
environment, having been oriented to their work environment, having authentication 
(sign on) privileges to the electronic record in their work environment, and having access 
to their work policies were invited to participate.  Following a participant’s agreement to 
enroll, I met with that individual to obtain informed consent and schedule the interview.  
Once informed consent was obtained, scheduling for the meeting time and place for the 
face-to-face interview with me occurred.  My contact information was provided so that 
the participant was able to contact me to answer any questions they may have had related 
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to logistics or the study.  Once enrolled to participate, each participant was assigned a 
unique code (ex. RN1, RN2, RN3, etc.) for identification.  Private space that was 
convenient for the member was provided for the interviewing session. 
As the primary researcher, I conducted the interviews and collected the data.  
Initially, there was a brief inquiry and collection of demographic data to align with the 
literature that has been established including variances between male and female, age, 
and educational preparation that have been shown to have a relationship to adoption of 
technology and change.  These demographic items may also play a role in the alignment 
to the construct themes of UTAUT toward use behavior. 
Each interview was expected to last approximately 30 to 45 minutes.  Each 
session was done in person with handwritten notes taken during the interview and an 
audio recording made of the session.  Following the interview session, the audio 
recording was submitted to a secure transcription company to be fully transcribed to a 
word document.  Following transcription, member checking was conducted.  The 
member checking is a process of participant review of their transcribed interview to 
assure accuracy of information.  The member checking allows the interviewee to verify 
that the information transcription is as accurate as possible (Harper & Cole, 2012).   
Following member checking the data was input to NVivo v11 software for 
analysis.  The data collection of all interviews was conducted over a period of 3 months 
to reach saturation.  During that period, I made a second outreach to the membership with 




At the conclusion of the interview, participants were thanked for their 
participation and offered a contact number if they had any questions that arose following 
their departure.  All information gathered in the face-to-face interview were to be 
transcribed verbatim into documents and stored into a secure computer program.  
Participants have been made aware of study results and presentations of the study through 
the Three Rivers Chapter AACN. 
Confidentiality was assured to the participants upon agreement to engage in the 
study as part of the consent process.  The participant was provided with my contact 
information upon enrollment.  My contact information was provided for the key purpose 
of contact in the event of a question but also in the event of the participant desiring to exit 
the study.  A participant was afforded the possibility to exit the study at any time for any 
reason.  The exit would be completed by contacting me to opt out. 
Data Analysis Plan 
Data analysis was conducted using NVivo v11 qualitative data analysis software.  
The data was input to the program from the interview observations, researcher notes, and 
transcriptions following the audio recordings and member checking of the interviews.  
Headings were used for theme development to capture key areas of concepts that 
emerged.  Several rounds of coding were required to identify the categories of themes 
(Bazeley & Jackson, 2013).  The themes represent the interviewees lived experiences 
related to perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT security.  
Bernauer, Lichtman, Jacobs, and Robinson (2013) discussed that NVivo provides a 
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model for researchers that allows them to use critical thinking processes in applications 
and presentation of data and conceptual relationships.  
The type of coding that I performed was labeling and chunking of information 
categories as themes emerge.  With the use of NVivo the natural language processing was 
used on text transcriptions to assist in the determination of themes along with the 
researcher determination and coding.  Crowston, Allen, and Heckman (2012) discussed 
the advantageous and cost effective nature of natural language processing when used in 
qualitative research processes.  Their work highlighted aspects of coding to include 
conceptual coding of emotional expressions, positive politeness, and negative politeness 
and the importance of capturing this information within the bracketing of information.  
According to Tufford and Newman (2012) and Sorsa, Kiikkala, and Astet-Kurki (2015) 
bracketing is used when personal experiences may trigger preconceptions about the 
information being collected.  By using bracketing throughout the collection of 
information and coding process awareness is maintained.  This information is being 
stored in NVivo. 
The researcher is responsible for acquiring the appropriate level of interpretive 
data from the interview that is fundamental in qualitative research (Merriam, 2014).  
When discrepant data is identified and is associated to a case interview that case would 
be excluded from the analysis and the inclusion for saturation.  The study credibility was 
strengthened by assuring that these measures are were place. 
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Issues of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
The qualitative case study method allows for construct validity through evidence 
established from a chain of multiple sources, member checking, pattern matching, 
explanation building and using logic models (Amerson, 2011). Internal validity was 
supported with saturation.  According to Fusch and Ness (2015), saturation is reached 
when there is no new information, no new coding, no new themes, and an ability to 
replicate the study and this must be in place to enhance the validity of the qualitative 
study. 
The interview questionnaire was submitted to an expert panel of four individuals 
who were experienced and respected as knowledgeable and proficient in informatics 
science and technology.  Each of the panel members were invited by email (Appendix C) 
to review the 31 questions that had been developed for relevance to the study, 
appropriateness to the topic, accuracy in content, and clarity to the population.  Two 
clarity issues were identified during the initial review.  Those issues were corrected.  
Following the corrections, a resubmission of the interview questions (Appendix D) was 
circulated to the expert panel for final review and approval.  Expert approval was granted 
by all members of the panel.  Validating the questionnaire through the use of an expert 
panel lends credibility to the process of qualitative research (Bengtsson, 2016). 
Transferability 
The external validity of this qualitative case study was supported by using the 
constructs of UTAUT as the foundation for the research questions.  The use of UTAUT 
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allows for an established protocol incorporated into the study design (Amerson, 2011).  
The framework of UTAUT and each of the constructs being used within this research 
study were established and validated thus support the work as proposed in this research 
study.  Thomas and Magilvy (2011) discussed the transferability of a study as applying 
research findings from one group or population to another.  The findings from this study 
were expected to have applicability to other clinical populations within the healthcare 
arena. 
Dependability 
Dependability was assured through comparative hand notes taken by the me and 
the audio recording that was transcribed verbatim by a secure transcription company with 
repeated review following transcription.  I conducted those repeated reviews of the audio 
recordings.  The purpose of the repeated reviews was to improve interpretation and 
identify cues related to the lived experience that had been shared during the interview.  I 
input all elements of data collected, researcher notes, audio recordings, transcripts, etc. 
into NVivo v11 software that provided assistance to me in determining accurate and 
dependable results. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability, sometimes considered neutrality of the qualitative study, was 
achieved when each of the following had been addressed according to Noble and Smith 
(2015); (a) truth value, (b) consistency, and (c) applicability.  Links, philosophical 
positions, or experiences associated to me functioning in the position as the researcher 
and were not revealed throughout.  Tufford and Newman (2012), and Sorsa et al. (2015) 
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identified that bracketing supports increased reflexivity by the researcher when conducted 
thoughtfully. 
Ethical Procedures 
The nine procedures of this research were conducted within the framework of 
approval under the Walden University Internal Review Board (IRB).  Permission to 
conduct this study was granted under IRB number 07-22-16-0232839 with an expiration 
date of July 21, 2017.  Within this approval informed consent was approved as described.  
All participant recruitment and data collection commenced following the approval of the 
research by the IRB. 
Confidentiality was assured to the participants upon agreement to engage in the 
study as part of the consent process.  The professional nursing organization participation 
provided for members from many areas within the region to participate.  Various 
locations of office settings that were both easy to access and not identified as specific to 
any identified organization or hospital were made available for use as the interview 
locations creating an anonymous setting.  The site was neither the same location as the 
professional organization nor their workplace.  Data collection occured through the 
interviews with audio recordings and journal notes resulting in transcripts and electronic 
data entry.  All data (transcripts, recordings, journal notes, and any other electronic data) 
are stored in a secure location in which all data is securely housed (external 
drive/password protected).  This measure allows for increased security, anonymity, and 
confidentiality for the participants.  Data handling and maintenance procedures were 
discussed with participants in full disclosure and transparency.  The transcribed 
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information from the interviews were stored in a secure computer environment.  The 
participant codes, consents, meeting schedules, and any other data collected were housed 
in a locked area that only I have access.  This data will be maintained for a period of 5 
years.  The destruction of contact information occurred following the completion of study 
and before the formal sharing of those results at professional forums. 
Summary 
This chapter included a presentation of the research methodology and design for 
this qualitative case study.  The purpose of the study and research questions were 
presented continuing to guide the study.  My role as the researcher was reviewed along 
with the relationship to the research participants.  Access to the population, protection of 
that population, and treatment of information including management of all data 
maintenance was detailed.  Interview procedures were reviewed as the method of data 
collection, followed by data analysis and assurance of rigor.  In Chapter 4, I discussed the 
data analysis procedures and presented study findings that included the labeling and 
themes that emerged from the case studies as they relate to the research questions.  
Finally, Chapter 5 addressed the interpretations, implications, and potential applications 
of the findings along with limitations and conclusions of the work, as well as identified 
future research.  Implications for social change are incorporated into the final discussion. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of the 
registered nurse (RN) within four of the constructs of the unified theory of acceptance 
and usage of technology (UTAUT) that are specific to use behavior (Venkatesh et al., 
2003).  Gaining insight into the lived experiences of RNs related to information 
technology (IT) security was at the heart of this study.  The experiences and perceptions 
of the RN were analyzed as they relate to the UTAUT constructs of performance 
expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions.  Using the 
UTAUT model as the theoretical framework, the following overarching research question 
was used for this study: What are RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-
reported behaviors of IT security? 
Using the four constructs of UTAUT that are consistent with behavioral intention 
and use behavior, the four following research questions were used as supportive to the 
overarching research question: 
RQ 1: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the performance expectancy of IT security practice? 
RQ 2: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the effort expectancy related to the IT security practice? 
RQ 3: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the social influence related to the IT security practice? 
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RQ 4: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the facilitating conditions of the IT security practice? 
In this chapter, I present the data analysis with results.  The data collection and 
analysis were derived from 20 RNs who met the requirements of participation, including 
that the individual was an RN and also a member of the professional organization Three 
Rivers Chapter of the American Association of Critical Care Nurses (AACN), worked 
full time in a clinical environment, had been oriented to the work environment, had 
authentication (sign on) privileges to the electronic record in the work environment, and 
had access to the work policies.  Each of the participants shared through an interview 
their experiences and information of those lived experiences related to IT security in the 
clinical area of which they were employed.  The results include insight from direct quotes 
of the participant interviews.  Exploration of the participants’ relationship with and 
knowledge of IT security as their lived experience has yielded multiple findings related to 
the RNs’ use of IT security in relation to the research questions with underlying similarity 
to research premises in quantitative studies presented in the literature review. 
Research Setting 
The face-to-face interviews were held in meeting spaces that were available to me 
and conveniently located for the participant.  All sessions were held in locations that 
provided privacy for the participants’ protection and quiet for recording purposes.  One 
participant requested to meet at her organization prior to her work shift, otherwise all 




Influences that may have impacted interviews include two participants scheduling 
interviews following their 12-hour shifts and two scheduling interviews immediately 
prior to their shifts of work.  In the first situation when the interviews were held 
following a shift, the participants could have been tired or anxious to finish quickly.  It 
was possible they might have just wanted to get home, although in both cases, the 
interviews were similar in length to all the others.  In the second scenario where they 
were scheduled prior to their shift, they might have been nervous about getting to work 
on time.  In both of these cases, they were relaxed during the interview and conversed 
openly without giving the impression that they were hurried. 
Participant Demographics and Sampling Strategy 
Following AACN approval through the Letter of Agreement (Appendix B) and 
IRB approval, emails were submitted to AACN members through the connections 
feature, fliers were circulated, and announcements were made at the local monthly 
meetings to garner participation from the purposeful population of the local AACN 
chapter, Three Rivers Chapter AACN membership.  The initial call for participants 
resulted in 14 responses over 2 months.  A follow up request was made that afforded an 
additional six responses.  Several members were interested in participating but did not 
meet the criteria for inclusion because they were fully immersed in an educational or 
management position and not currently practicing in a clinical area.  The criteria for 
participation included that the individual was an RN and also a member of the 
professional organization Three Rivers Chapter AACN, worked full time in a clinical 
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environment, had been oriented to the work environment, had authentication privileges to 
the electronic record in the work environment, and had access to the work policies. 
Those who participated in the study came from the Three Rivers Chapter AACN 
that has over 224 members, with about 30 members actively participating in monthly 
meetings.  The members come from various hospitals and hospital systems from the 
tristate area of Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia.  The RNs who 
participated in the study came with a wide range of experiences although not included in 
the demographic data.  Some were lifelong critical care RNs, others had experiences in 
many different clinical settings.  Some had been staff nurses throughout their career, and 
others had various specialty or management experiences in their past.  I did not collect 
these types of details within the demographic details.  The demographic data were 
purposefully kept to a minimum to maintain anonymity.  Following the introductory 
discussion, the demographics were discussed.  Each participant was given an option to 
opt out or to share the demographic information that included (a) their sexual 
identification as male or female, (b) the age range group that they fit into, (c) the highest 
RN education that they had received, (d) the highest non-RN education they had 












RN 1 F 26-35 BSN — 5 
RN 2 F 56-65 MSN — 39 
RN 3 F 66+ MSN — 50 
RN 4 F 56-65 MSN — 28 
RN 5 F 26-35 Diploma BS 2 
RN 6 F 56-65 MSN — 35 
RN 7 F 26-35 BSN — 7 
RN 8 F 46-55 BSN — 27 
RN 9 F 46-55 BSN BS 30 
RN 10 F 46-55 BSN LNCC 8 
RN 11 F 26-35 BSN — 5 
RN 12 F 46-55 BSN — 28 
RN 13 M 26-35 AD BS 2 
RN 14 F 56-65 BSN — 37 
RN 15 M 36-45 AD MBA/HMS 10 
RN 16 F 56-65 Diploma — 37 
RN 17 F 46-55 BSN — 31 
RN 18 F 26-35 BSN — 4 
RN 19 F 46-55 Diploma — 28 





Data collection was conducted as approved by the IRB to fulfill the study 
requirements.  A targeted approach was conducted for recruitment of participants from 
the Three Rivers Chapter AACN professional nursing organization using email contacts, 
fliers, and chapter newsletter articles.  Recruitment for the study was voluntary and 
criteria based with self-reported verification.  The 20 RNs who volunteered to participate 
in the study met the criteria of being a member of the Three Rivers Chapter AACN, 
working full time in the clinical environment, having been oriented to their work 
environment, having authentication privileges to the electronic record in their work 
environment, and having access to their work policies.  Following a participant’s 
agreement to enroll, I met with that individual to schedule a meeting time and place.  
During the scheduled face-to-face meeting following a brief introduction, I conducted an 
explanation of the research, reviewed the informed consent with provision for questions 
and clarification, and obtained signed consent for participation.  Once informed consent 
was obtained, the face-to-face interview began.   
My contact information was provided so that the participant would be able to 
contact me to answer any questions they may have related to logistics or the study.  As 
each participant was enrolled he or she was assigned a unique code (ex. RN1, RN2, RN3, 
etc.) for identification.  This code was cross referenced on a master list that only I 
maintained.  The voice recording and any other records of the interview, including my 
interview notes were recorded using the candidate’s unique code only.  The candidates 
were instructed on the privacy coding and security of data management.  They were 
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given the information about the transcriber being the only other individual receiving the 
recorded file that would be identified only by the assigned unique code.   
Prior to recording the interview, I collected demographic information from the 
candidate.  Following the initial conversation and demographic questioning, I waited 
until the candidate was generally exhibiting a sense of being comfortable.  I then 
conducted the interview, both recording the session and taking researcher notes as data 
collection methods.  The 20 interviews lasted between 26 and 38 minutes.  Following 
each of the interview sessions, the audio recording was transcribed verbatim to a word 
document by a secure transcription company.  Upon return of the transcribed document, I 
reviewed it for any major errors and then forwarded it to the candidate so that member 
checking could be conducted.  The member checking process for most participants did 
not require any changes.  However, two participants, RN 17 and RN 19 had several 
requests for changes to their documents that were made through multiple rounds of 
review.  Harper and Cole (2012) discussed that member checking is the method of 
assuring accuracy of the transcription when allowing the interviewee to review the 
document.  Following completion of member checking, the data were input to NVivo v11 
software for analysis.   
The data collection from interviews was conducted over a period of 3 months to 
reach saturation and volume.  Neither the minimum number of participants, nor saturation 
was reached with the initial call for participation so a second round of targeted 
recruitment occurred.  Following the second recruitment effort there were enough 
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interviews accomplished to reach both minimum number of participants for the study and 
saturation.  
Once the recording of an interview was concluded, the participant was thanked 
for his or her participation and offered a contact number in the event that he or she might 
have questions or would decide that they wanted to withdraw from the study for any 
reason following the departure.  Each participant was reassured of his or her privacy, 
understanding the data would be maintained for 5 years with the electronic files being 
encrypted and along with other files be locked in a secure location.  Each participant 
folder that is identified with a unique identifier maintains my individual notes.  Those 
folders are locked securely along with all other paper materials and the encrypted drive of 
files (voice recordings, excel. NVivo) from this study. 
Data Analysis 
I used inductive and deductive coding for data analysis.  I first used coding that 
aligned with the UTAUT theoretical framework that the research questions were based 
upon and the general area category titles of the topics of questions included in the 
interview.  Then I went back and identified additional themes that were emerging from 
the response text naming codes into categories of similar content.  I linked the codes 
following the two sessions of coding to identify like nodes and classifications of codes 
allowing for a comprehensive and thorough coding of the data.  This coding effort 
identified predetermined nodes and emerging nodes resulting in a total of 62 nodes.  
Detailed assessment and further coding allowed for the combination and coordination of 
primary themes and subthemes (both parent and child nodes) and was finalized into 42 
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nodes with eight parent nodes or primary themes within NVivo v11.  Six of the eight 
parent nodes have UTAUT constructs that correspond with the nature of the parent and 
child nodes (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Parent nodes and associated UTAUT constructs.  Parent nodes identified and 
compiled with UTAUT constructs during data analysis to identify findings for the answer 
to the overarching research question. 
 
Each of the primary themes and subthemes is presented with a representation of 
participant quotes to represent the findings within that theme or subtheme development. 
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Primary Theme 1: Walk Away No Log-Off 
Computer log-off was discussed in the literature review as an important aspect of 
IT security presented as a potential for lack of understanding or connection with IT 
security.  Albarrak (2012) discussed that 16% of the nurses allowing for others to access 
confidential information under their authentication was because they did not log-off of 
the system.  The lived experience of this sample is that walking away from the computer 
without log-off is a reality as part of the regular workflow.  Samples of participant 
responses are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Primary Theme 1: Walk Away No Log-Off 
Participant Response 
RN 1 “I think that nurses are always pulled in a couple of different directions at 
one time. So, you’re doing multiple things. Whether you have a computer 
actually in the room and you walk away from it or it’s a computer at the 
desk and you end up walking away from it due to family, call bells, 
doctors, grounds, I mean times of different scenarios. But I have been 
guilty.” 
 
RN 11 “Pretty much all the time. Constantly if I have to run to a med room 
because I was getting medication and I forget to grab a medication. To go 
in and say for example maybe I work in the ICU. So, if a patient is 
starting to wake up then attempts to self-exacerbate or something crazy 
like that, like fly right in the room. So, pretty frequently.” 
 
RN 15 “Oh! They are several, I work in the ICU. So, I'm constantly called away 
to answer a monitor or a colleague and there some pretty important things 
we have in the IUC to answer this quickly. So, I’d say during shift I'm 
probably called away without logging off my computer at least 6 times.” 
 
RN 9 “Only usually during an emergency. Like if something they might have a 
patient jumps out of bed and you got to catch them or something on the 




Participants described the desire to log-off believing it was the correct process but that it 
was not part of their regular workflow.  Three respondents stated that they do log-off but 
they went on to describe situations that occur causing situations with an inability to log-
off. 
 Within this first primary theme there were six subthemes to emerge.  They include 
staff awareness of safeguards in place to protect them if they walked away from their 
computer and left it unattended, did those safeguards inhibit patient care, were they aware 
if anyone had ever used their account, what was the unit norm for log-off, what did they 
think others reasons were for not logging off, and did it make a difference if the computer 
could be seen.  Examples of participant responses are shared in Tables 3 - 8.   
Table 3 
Safeguard for Walk Away 
Participant Response 
RN 2 “I do know that the computer does log off, after a period of time, but I 
don’t recall what that period of time is. Because I know that, if I don’t 
utilize the electronic medical record for you know some period of time it 
just automatically logs you off. So, I don’t know the exact time but there 
is some type of safeguard.” 
 
RN 5 “I know our system does log you off after a certain amount of time, and it 
will lock it for you. But I’m not sure of the amount of time that is.” 
 
RN 6 “Yes, after a time period the computer goes into a, like shut down mode 
or it logs me off automatically.” 
 
RN 7 “I know like it goes to a screensaver that locks out, but I don’t know how 





 Sethi, Lane, Newton, Egan, & Ghosh (2014) discussed that the clinical desktop at 
the nursing station is a source of potential breach and is best to have an auto log-off.  The 
RNs were aware that there was a safeguard but they did not know the timing nor how it 
actually worked.  A few included that the feature was more of a hindrance to their care 
than a help.  They discussed that because it had such a rapid lock out feature that they 
were then required to login again quite regularly throughout the shift causing wasted 
time.  This created the next theme of Walk away safeguard inhibiting care. 
Table 4 
Walk Away Safeguard Inhibits Care 
Participant Response 
RN 1 “I’m at the patient’s bedside and then all of a sudden it’s already logged 
off.  So, I guess those are good things.  Sometimes they delay care 
because you’re constantly logging back in when you’re at the bedside.” 
 
RN 10 “I think maybe if the screen would not time out, I could give better care.  
It is a distractor.” 
 
RN 16 “Sometimes they delay care because you’re constantly logging back in 
while at the bedside.” 
 
 
 Gaining insight into the RNs understanding of what happens during that period of 
time while the computer is unattended and logged in under their authentication 
credentials was provided during discussion with these elements.  They each discussed 
what happens while they are not logged off and away from the computer, had anyone 
used their computer.  Many of the nurses responded in a way that signified an emotional 
strong interest to discuss this topic.  They were open to discuss situations demonstrating 
97 
 
that accounts could easily be used between people and electronic signatures would be 
intertwined.  They discussed the risks of this documentation, authentication of wrong 
types of accounts such as physician for nurse and vice versa, and the general risk of 
access to information that is not appropriate.  They expressed passion and interest for 
detail as they engaged in their recounts of situations related to account use and misuse.  
Two respondents were very concerned about the “trouble” (discipline) they would face 
because they were looking at records they should not be viewing. 
Table 5 
Someone Used My Account 
Participant Response 
RN 13 “Yes, like if you logged on and you might walk away for a second 
somebody just wants to print out a clinical note or other clinical doc.” 
 
RN 5 “Yes, some just jump on the logged-on computers if you might walk away 
for a second when they just want to view labs or clinical info.” 
 
RN 8 “Yes, because I’ve come back to the desk and found doctors using mine, 
like where I haven’t signed out and my name is still on the computer. I 
make them log off, log back in under their own name.” 
 
RN 8 “Yes, and they were looking at patient records which that’s not my patient 
that I’m caring for and I can get in trouble.” 
 
 
 Each participant was willing to discuss the unit norm and while they generally 
began their discussion with the unit norm is to log-off, they would quickly follow up with 
reasons why their peers did not log-off on a regular basis.  With probing into this matter 
of log-off, they would describe that there was widespread variation in log-off procedures 




Unit Norm: No Log-Off 
Participant Response 
RN 2 “In some cases, if someone is taking care of their patient they may have 
their WOW at the door and then they go and take care of the patients but 
without logging off. Sometimes they, will have their screen still be out, 
but they will go and get medicines, they will go and get any patient care 
supplies. 
So, it’s not consistent, that people log off as soon as they walk away from 
the screen. It’s like up, with the patient’s information there it may not be 
facing a common area, sometimes it is, sometimes it’s not. So, I can 
definitely see kind of a mix of both, where screen has been facing public 
areas, and the screens where, times when the screen is not facing public 
areas. 
I guess kind of a little bit of both distraction, thinking about their next task 
that they have to do rather than you know logging out and securing the 
computer before they leave.” 
 
RN 7 “I would say more often than not people are not logging off, it just 
depends I guess how busy we are. Or you’re probably in the middle of 
doing stuff, walk away, you know, kind of forget to log off. You’re just 
going to be like, oh crap, I didn’t log off and then.” 
 
RN 8 “I would think it’s a norm to walk away without logging off.” 
 
RN 18 “I’d say the norm is not logging off. We have had computers in every 
room as well as outside of the rooms and also at the nursing station. It’s 
not uncommon to have a nurse leave their screen up in a room or 
especially in a nurse’s station.” 
 
 
 While discussing peers not logging off, additional discussion and insight into 
those reasons for no log-off emerged and formulated the subtheme for why others in the 
unit did not log-off.  While the RNs were only attempting to surmise these reasons 
because they know the workflow and work closely within the unit, it was reasonable to 




Unit Others: No Log-Off Reason 
Participant Response 
RN 12 “I think it’s a matter of convenience they just walk away or they think 
they are going to come back and pick up where they left off. Like if they 
are interrupted to go see a patient or whatever. But, many times they are 
done with rounds and they are logged on until it actually logs them out 
automatically.” 
 
RN 14 “I see people leaving theirs, because that’s where they are charting at this 
particular desk. But then it really, it shuts off, I mean you can’t keep it the 
whole night.  Researcher note: Participant looked visibly upset during this 
discussion as if she was shaking with concern for the violation in 
process.” 
 
RN 17 “They could have looked at meds and went to get the meds and just 
wanted to still be in that computer because they have to go to the med cart 
and then come back and check their meds against the med list.  They 
didn’t want to log in again because it takes too long to boot up.” 
 
RN 18 “I think it’s probably mostly convenience. Also, I think sometimes if 
nurses are in the middle of charting a complete assessment. They may fear 
that closing out that they’ll lose their spot even though that’s not true.  




 The subtheme of computers being seen emerged as participants’ responses about 
computer location on their units and the workflow that they use to document related to 
log-off.  RNs and physicians have a code of honesty so they feel protected in their 
domain and if the computer is in a zone that only they can see they feel as though they 
will protect it so there is less need to log-off.  If it is not in a zone that is well protected or 





Computers Can Be Seen 
Participant Response 
RN 6 “Where I work is pretty open and you can, everyone has visuals of what’s 
happening. So, if someone walked over you would see it.” Researcher 
Note:  Implied in discussion that staff would go right to it and protect that 
PC. 
 
RN 9 “If somebody was at a computer where you were, and they didn’t belong 
there, especially at the bedside that would be very obvious.” 
 
RN 2 “If we see each other’s computers, we protect those so that no one 




While not all nurses specifically discussed the visualization of the computers they 
each echoed the concept of trust working as a group within their respective units.  This 
extended into the discussion of passwords and the use of accounts or working with each 
other in the clinical area. 
Primary Theme 2: Password Challenges 
 The primary theme of password challenges had subthemes emerge in the areas of 
ease of use/log-on, supports workflow, sharing password or account, password sharing 
situation, reward for sharing, share by badge scanning, password frustration, and clinical 
concern.  Albarrak (2012) identified that the behaviors of nurses allow for the potential 
security risk related to the password practices.  The findings in the interviews of these 20 
participants found that there are many password challenges they face and these tend to 




Primary Theme 2: Password Challenges 
Participant Response 
RN 3 “I’ve had to change it because I was told by security that, I guess they do 
a check on social media and somehow my password was seen somewhere 
and I had to change it.” 
 
RN 6 “Before it was a simple password, now it’s a complicated password that 
you have to come up invent some complicated password. Now, they don’t 
want you to reuse a password that you’ve used in the past. So, that’s made 
it more complicated.” 
 
RN 14 “I mean you have to change it. Well so far, I think I’ve only had to change 
it twice in epic but you finally get your grove with the numbers and the 
letters and you know the password and then 3 months later you are 
changing it again. So, it’s just hard, we have so many passwords all the 
times and then you are off for a week and you are like, okay, my 
password was just changed which one was it now, they are trying, we 
should write it down more often.” 
 
RN 15 “The problem too with the passwords is, like sometimes I would just 
make a change on it, like maybe, like say my password is abcdefg capital 
A, then you had to add a number oh! I would make the last number 1. 
Then the next time I have to change I'll make capital A, bcdefg2. Well our 
systems seem to be getting a little smarter. They are like, “Well you can't 
have that because that’s similar to what your last one was.” So, then you 
have to come up with something brand new and then that really makes it 
hard to remember what that password is. Especially when it's one of the 
accounts that you don’t use too often.” 
 
 
Challenges of password is closely associated to password use which was quickly 
identified as a subtheme with rich information related to the many additions of 






Password Ease of Use 
Participant Response 
RN 5 “Very easy because now we have finger prints AcuDose but then to log 
on to our computer we just use single sign on, so, I only have to type it in 
once my whole shift and that’s it.  Then any time after that you can just 
use your badge to enroll, sign you on automatically.” 
 
RN 8 “Your badge is encrypted and you touch, they have little, there are little 
boxes on your computer that you just, you log in the first time in the 
morning and it will keep you, I would say it’s probably 12½ hours, it’ll, 
when you tap your badge to that box it will log you in. which I can see 
will be a problem with someone that holds a badge.” 
 
RN 11 “Pretty easy, I usually stick with one or two, and switch between the 2, 
and I try to just keep it simple so, I would say it’s easy.” 
 
RN 20 “Pretty easy, I’m pretty sufficient with being able to type quickly so, I can 
memorize my password for the 12 weeks or whatever it is until I have to 
reset the new one.” 
 
 
Ease of use for password was considered to be fairly easy and adjunct technology 
was considered better than the electronic medical record because it was typically 
described as more advanced including fingerprint or single sign on (SSO) technology.  





Ease of Log-In 
Participant Response 
RN 10 “Pixis, Epic, and the email were all the same log-on. So, when you would 
go to get your meds out it was the same, along with the finger press scan, 
your initial sign and it was all the same password and then log in. So, it 
made it easier.” 
 
RN 13 “We have finger prints for AcuDose and log on to our computer with 
badge to enroll.  This will sign you on automatically so sign in is only 
once my whole shift then I just tap and get on the computer.” 
 
RN 18 “Single sign in badge works for all systems that you access.” 
 
 
 The responses related to ease of log-on for many participants was a discussion 
specific to the use of single sign on (SSO) technology related to timesaving and 
advantages for workflow.  Password effect on RN workflow followed in the discussion. 
Table 12 
Password Supports Workflow 
Participant Response 
RN 1 “I think there is a necessity for passwords, I do like at, my casual job that 
I can type your password in and you’re logged in to the system and then 
you can actually scan your badge. So, that helps my workflow.” 
 
RN 11 “I would say the password is part of my work. I think if an error occurs, 
like say narcotic discrepancies or meds that were previously given. it’s 
easier to track future discrepancies and the medication for example. I 
think it easily identifies the user in case there is an error with anything.” 
 
RN 19 “Yeah because no one can get into it and access your stuff.” 
 




 Once password challenges and password workflows were freely discussed the 
sharing of passwords and accounts were discussed as a consequence of difficulty of 
password access.  While some participants reacted somewhat cautiously all responded 
openly and willing to talk about unit culture and their “feeling” about what should or 
should not happen and what actually happens during their normal days at work.  There 
were no responses of individual sharing of a password.  Several participants shared 
situations of knowing of sharing passwords and being aware of sharing but they 
personally had never shared their password.  Several participants had shared accounts 
through badge sharing which is described as a separate subtheme, Share by Badge 





Sharing Password or Account 
Participant Response 
RN 2 “I have not shared, not me personally.” 
 
RN 10 “I can’t imagine needing anyone else’s password if we have the same 
access.” 
 
RN 14 “I don’t feel like, since we moved to a new system, but before we have 
somebody that’s very busy. You are in the middle of resuscitating a 
patient and you had already logged on your charting and somebody will 
say, “What’s your password?” Because they want to close your thing out 
so they can jump on finish charting whatever were doing in the room.” 
RN 15 “I can honestly say, I've never given either to each and that’s only because 
I have such a paranoid personality that even close coworker would. Well 
here is something that happened years ago. Coworker as a practical joke 
someone left their computer open and while the person was gone she went 
in and typed kind of like something funny in the chart. That wouldn’t be 
appropriate to be written on the chart and was certainly not related to the 
patient at all. The person came back and maybe types the person and hits 
save. So, that now became part of the preliminary record. I felt, “Oh! My 
God! I can never have that happen to me.” I felt oh! You know I have 
worked with a bunch of tricksters and stuff not that this would ever 
happen and be like such one of the better chance of happen.  
So, I just never have given that out. I've been in situations where other 
people have said to me, “Oh! my password is just, just type it in really 
quick.” You know they need something and I do. But I keep thinking well 
I can't be the person to go back in and do it. Plus, I can't remember 
password. So, a series of numbers after that I can't remember. So, I won't 




Several participants discussed situations that sharing passwords might occur or 
that they had been aware of password sharing in the past.  Those situations were captured 





Password Sharing Situation 
Participant Response 
RN 4 “They don’t have time to document so, they will do it for them or they 
will, the nurse will do it and she would, the doctor might say, put some 
orders in for me. So, they would know their password and then put them 
in or the doctor would walk away and say, my computer is open you can 
use it and put these orders in or look for this for me.” 
RN 11 “I know sometimes people, people that have previously worked where I 
currently work will come back to pick up like over time. But then are not 
in like press B system anymore. So, they get kind of logged out of certain 
things, and I think in that instance they would like need to use somebody 
else’s ID and password.” 
 
RN 15 “It's usually like an emergency situation. Beginning with I work in ICU 
so, patient is going on the tubes and they are hanging a bunch of bags like 
pressers which keeps blood pressure up. They are just like, “Type this in 
and try that we hang this or throw a set of vitals in for me real quick?” 
because they are maybe doing God knows what.  
I mean if there are expressions or something that should not be written 
down manually but we might not have gotten to that point yet but we 
might be suffering the dream we call it. We just want to start documenting 
but they have so many other things they need to do.” 
 
RN 19 “If someone is at home and you want to look up their lab work and they 
are not there. Or you want to check something for them that is their 
personal information in their chart.” 
 
 
Interestingly, one of the examples of sharing passwords was for personal record 
review while the employee was off campus and had another employee check their 
personal health record.  In this scenario, it was not related to access to the electronic 
medical record for patient care, documentation, or workflow improvement.  According to 
the participant this information could have been gained through a patient portal by the 
individual who had shared the password.  When the aspects of password sharing 
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situations were provided, I probed and asked what the reward for sharing a password 
might be.  The rewards became another subtheme. 
Table 15 
Reward for Sharing 
Participant Response 
RN 4 “The benefit is to know that he or she doesn’t have to do the work that the 
nurse is doing the work for them.” 
 
RN 5 “It’s just faster because to log on and to log off takes so long.” 
 
RN 11 “They can’t get in to anything because they are not necessarily in press B 
system anymore, but kind of outsource or work elsewhere. Now have 
access to system through our password.” 
 
RN 14 “That’s for the patient, I mean it’s because we are busy doing patient care. 
I mean we are not just sitting at the desk next to them. We are not 
standing next to them in the room, you know, I mean we are busy 
physically doing something with the patient that I can’t really just turn 
around and put my password in if I’m changing an IV dressing.” 
 
 
 There was no identification by participants that they personally shared their 
password but they shared many examples of password sharing that they were aware of 
previously in their experience and currently within their departments.  Through the 
discussion of advantages, a twist on sharing passwords was described.  This subtheme is 
about account sharing in that the RNs with a badge registered as single sign on (SSO) 
will swipe in and allow another RN to use their account for access or pass off their badge 
to allow access, primarily for documentation and review of data.  Respondents described 





Share by Badge Scanning 
Participant Response 
RN 1 “I do like at, my casual job how you can type your password in and you’re 
logged in to the system and then you can actually scan your badge. So, 
that helps my workflow and our team working together sharing.” 
 
RN 5 “So, we actually do use each other’s account by swiping the badge for 
each other during rapid admissions and critical events when we work as a 
team.  But we never do share actual passwords.” 
 
RN 13 “I’m getting an admission and they’re charting.  I give them my badge so 
they do single sign on under my name. They can search for anything 
under me like vital signs, new labs, and stuff.” 
 
RN 18 “Other than that, sometimes the badging situation can be of concern if 
people lend their badges out to go get coffees. Or lend their badges out to 
get to medication room. So, if they logged in once with their passwords 
that the badge can find into any computer with just tapping it on by the 
computer.  Most times that the badges are handed off is when we have 
like a coffee shops and a bunch of people want coffee. So, one person will 
go to pay for it because we can pay with our badges too.  Then there are 
scenarios, not too often but if I'm in a patient’s room doing patient care 
and one of the nursing assistants comes up to me and says they need in the 
medication room which is only in the night shift. Because they stock in 
there they have to get in but they don’t have access with their badges. So, 
they have to get our badge to get in so that they can stock and that’s it.” 
 
 
While discussing the need to share badges and other password practices there 
were discussions of frustrations with passwords.  Balozian and Leidner (2016) discussed 
the developments of frustration creating an avoidance of technology and the use of 
security practices.  This is consistent with the findings of the participants in this study as 







RN 1 “It’s time consuming to retype that all the time, but my fulltime job, we 
don’t have that capability of scanning the badge. So, I do have to 
physically type my password every time I go on to a computer.” 
 
RN 6 “It gets more complicated, I think as the years have gone by. Before it was 
a simple password, now it’s a complicated password that you have to 
come up invent some complicated password. Now, they don’t want you to 
reuse a password that you’ve used in the past. So, more complicated. 
And we have so many logins. I mean to get to the actual screen where I’m 
doing my work, I’ve signed in, or I attempted to sign in 3 or 4 times. You 
sign in and maybe you mistype or have a typo to sign in again.  
Then another screen pops up and then you have to sign in again and then 
you might mistype again. So, times it’s like 4 or 5 attempts to signing in 
before you actually can get your work done.” 
 
RN 12 “We have so many different passwords for different things, and they let 
you help to log in and we can use them simultaneously if there are all 
logging out after only a few seconds. That’s just going to take more time 
away from the bed side care.” 
 
RN 17 “Logging in and off just this morning I had to look at chart records and it 
was 3 screens that I had to log into just to get there. I don’t know why but 
I do that many times a day.  Our organization is so built on administration 
and then this world that takes care of patients that they don’t realize the 
impact and like say, “Oh! Didn’t you get that email?” well the email does 
not cross into the patient. But it's all these layers of security that sort of 
make a barrier for you to get that information flow to this information 
flow. So, now I didn’t know that the system is going down in 5 minutes.  
Now I didn’t know that because I don’t look at my emails while I'm 
taking care of patients. I think security is probably why we don’t easily 
connect. I don’t know why it's not my thing to know. But they are 
completely different worlds.” 
 
 
The frustrations that were described by the participants impact the workflow within the 
clinical practice of the work environment.  RNs perceive that both the time factor and 
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impact to care are important in the process of password use.  Along with frustrations, 
participants discussed the clinical concerns that arise when using passwords and 




RN 10 “At this point, I would worry about if somebody would kind of get into 
my password is utilizing it to way smart cards like that.  Even when I do 
sign off. I mean that’s the big worry in the hospital is job diversion and I 
would be concerned that if somebody knows there is a way to waste in 
computer system that will not need someone. Like if you wasted the med 
station you would be able to focus that there is a way to do it through epic 
that also wasted with, at the bed side?  So, you don’t have to go to the 
med station, however, if somebody had your password they would be able 
to do that without you there. So, that’s the only thing I’ve noticed so far, 
“You can do this here too?” So, if somebody did get someone’s password, 
they would be able to simulate that person wasting on my card.” 
 
RN 15 “It's usually like an emergency situation. Beginning with I work in ICU 
so, patient is going on the tubes and they are hanging a bunch of bags like 
pressers which keeps blood pressure up. They are just like, “Type this in 
and try that we hang this or throw a set of vitals in for me real quick?” 
because they are maybe doing God knows what.  I mean if there are 
expressions or something that should not be written down manually but 
we might not have gotten to that point yet but we might be suffering the 
dream we call it. We just want to start documenting but they have so 
many other things they need to do.” 
 
RN 2 “New hires as orientees do not get log-ins for quite a while and that poses 
a problem for them that they could either do their patient care, or do their, 
you know look up their labs, and get in the systems. So, that they can 
actually look at orders without the preceptor actually doing it for them.  I 
guess they could, the preceptor could log in but, I think I would say, the 
only benefit I could see for them doing this, is just for their ease of work. 
With the preceptor not doing all the pieces but I do know that there is a 





These clinical concerns impact immediate access to information, ability to provide 
clinical care, and employee participation as a team in information.  Although these 
concerns might be considered frustrations to some they were very clearly and emotionally 
described as a concern, very differently than the frustraters.  This theme was 
differentiated based on researcher notes and cues from interview that identified the 
content as a “concern” that would occur in the clinical area related to care and workflow 
processes related to direct care.  The scholarly literature shows that Albarrak (2012) 
reported the password sharing at a rate of 33%, Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015) at a rate 
of 31.7 %, and Medlin et al. (2008) at a rate of 73%.  In these three studies, sharing of 
passwords occurred with coworkers or colleagues and friends of their coworkers.  In all 
of the quantitative studies there is no insight into the reasons for sharing passwords.  The 
primary theme and subthemes reported here begin to reveal insight into the challenges 
faced in the process of password and account use and why password and account sharing 
might occur. 
Primary Theme 3: Managing Password 
Managing a password was reviewed in the scholarly literature as important to 
maintaining IT security.  Albarrak (2012), Belanger (2011), and Medlin et al. (2008) each 
discussed the development of passwords and identified that users do not choose to create 
strong passwords even though they have the knowledge.  User preference is “ease of use” 
(Belanger, 2011).  In most situations, it is difficult to memorize a password that meets the 
definition of complex, this leads to easy or familiar password creation (Medlin et al., 
2008).  How RNs perceive the management of their password is important to understand 
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based on the literature.  This Primary theme contains the subthemes of password 
development, remembering password, change password how often, password support, 
action if someone knows password, worry about password. 
Table 19 
Primary Theme 3: Managing Password 
Participant Response 
RN 6 “I think it’s just remembering it and I wrote it in my phone. Because there 
are so many passwords you have to remember. I mean there is the 
pharmacy password, there is MyPay password, there is the TMS.” 
 
RN 8 “I don’t give it out to anybody and most people are pretty good about 
when you’re logging into the AcuDose they probably look the other way. 
They try to respect your, the privacy of your password or I try to shield it 
with hand, to shield with my body especially for things like narcotics.” 
 
RN 11 “I try to memorize it not write it down. I usually stick between 2 
passwords. So, when I’m prompted to change it in the system I’ll, you 
know won’t forget if I change it to something totally different. I try to 
keep them like they pertain to my life like pets or family members or 
something like that.” 
 
RN 20 “Just remember it.” 
 
 
 As described in several responses the RNs are trying to memorize the password, 
write it down, and protect it from visualization.  In all cases, they try to protect the 
password in some way.  Development descriptions were similar to those described in the 
literature.  Each participant made their password something familiar to them that they 
would remember.  They described that they would use something familiar, including 
names of spouse, child, or pet, dates of birth, and other specific personal information or a 
systematic approach that they would repeat.  Several participants described following the 
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system requirements while using familiar content.  They reported that they would just use 





RN 3 “Whatever instructions I’m given, that’s what I, how I change my 
password or develop it. That’s another way I want to do it, but sometimes 
if it tells me I have to have it in capital I do that with some digits.” 
 
RN 6 “Digits, letters, characters, usually something that helps me, something 
that is easy for me to remember. Usually kind of a birth date, a name.” 
 
RN 10 “I try to make it something that I will remember. Usually some version of 
my initials or something that I’ve used in the past, like a version of 
something I’ve used in the past that reminds me my children or 
something. I only have like 3 that I alternate and I have to change things 
and it’s always one of those 3 versions.” 
 
RN 15 “I came up with something that’s in the category, let's say colors so say I 
decide to keep my base password, a color. So, it will be let's say blue. 
Then the next time I'll need to change it I'll make it red. Then next time, 
I'll change it to make it orange. So, it's always going to be a color, 
something like that. 
Then, if it asks me to change it’ll be like capital B and then blue, you 
know because you have to have a capital and then blue. So, I know I'm 
stating in a color scheme. Then the number, I might make it, say the year, 
you know whatever year it is. Let's say its 2016 there will be blue 2016, 
but if it got, yeah blue 2016, or Blue16.” 
 
 
 Remembering a password or committing it to a secure place for safekeeping is 
something that I was very interested to hear about as the participants began to discuss 
their approach to how they remember their password.  The responses of committing the 
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password to memory made me wonder about the complexity of the password but at no 
time during the interview did I ask for or probe for a password.  There were a few times 
that I suspected a participant might share a password and I cautioned them that I did not 




RN 2 “Aside from writing it down, in the book that I carry in my pocket, I 
usually try to remember my password. It’s usually when I come back or 
you know if I am on vacation it’s when I have to try and remember it.” 
 
RN 3 “I have it written down, but it’s kind of coded.” 
 
RN 4 “I do not write it down here where I work, it’s not in my phone, it is 
written at home.” 
 
RN 9 “It’s just in my mind.” 
 
RN 13 “I wrote it on the back on my badge so I don’t forget.” 
 
 
 Frequency of changing passwords contributes to overall security of an IT system.  
In this subtheme, the responses demonstrate what happens with changing passwords over 
time in the lived experience.  16 participants have not had to change passwords for long 
periods of time.  Those who have had to change passwords report that it causes confusion 
because they have to use different passwords or variations then they have difficulty 





Change Password: How Often 
Participant Response 
RN 4 “I don’t change it frequently because in this situation we’re not asked to 
change it frequently.” 
 
RN 5 “Never.” 
 
RN 7 “I don’t change it, because then I won’t remember it.” 
 
RN 19 “Meditech you have to change it every couple of months. Regular 
computer we never have to change it. They don’t make us.” 
 
 
 RNs are clinical and sometimes need support.  They discussed who they believe is 
the support they have for passwords when needed.  As evidenced by one of the responses 




RN 1 “I’ll call IT and they always give me a temporary one (password) and then 
I create a new one.” 
 
RN 12 “Sometimes you can call the help desk and get it(password) that way, 
other times you have to go right through talk to somebody in IT security. 
So, it’s not always the same person or the same way that you go around to 
get a password.” 
 
RN 15 “Sometimes IT help is needed to fix a password or computer or decide 





 Other than purposefully sharing a password what would an RN do if they 
discovered that someone knew their password?  What level of urgency would there be in 
an action?  This subtheme provided insight into the actions that the RNs would take.  
Many of the participants would require assistance in knowing how to get a password 
changed.   
Table 24 
Action Taken if Someone Knows Password 
Participant Response 
RN 1 “I will change it.” 
 
RN 6 “I probably won’t take any action. Because it changes with every 3 
months.” 
 
RN 15 “I would like to think that I would change it but then I don’t know that I 
would. Like if a trusted friend I would probably just let it slide like I had 
given it out. Maybe I felt somebody was or I know somebody did it.” 
 
RN 18 “Not knowing who to even go to about changing my password, I’d 
probably alert my manager first to receive some guidance at least about 
where to go. So, that she was aware and look into possibly my password 
being used for things that I didn’t do. But then IT would be contacted 
promptly to really send me password so that I can actually log on. 
That’s a really tough one to think about because even if it’s a night shift, 
so I figured out someone knew my password. I don’t know if I would call 
my manager at the middle of the night so I may continue to chart with my 
password knowing that I could at least log in and know what I charted 
versus what someone else could have put in.” 
 
 
Fifteen of the participants would change their password either immediately or as 
soon as they could figure out how to make the change.  The other five would not take 
action to change their password and considered it a low priority that did not seem to 
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concern them.  Given the concern for breach of password, potential for worry was a 
theme that rose from several participants but was related to external passwords not work 
related. 
Table 25 
Worry About Password 
Participant Response 
RN 1 “I’m always on the lookout but I don’t, I don’t worry because I really do 
feel like people don’t want you to take their passwords. So, I don’t think 
they would want to take my password. I think it’s a mutual understanding 
respect.” 
 
RN 3 “Yes, but it’s, I worry about it but I know I have a secure password at 
least from what I feel. But I always know that somebody somehow could 
in some remote way still hack into an account that I have, even though I 
have a password for it that I feel secure.” 
 
RN 6 “I worry that I’ll forget it, like after I’m off for an extended period of time 
then if you forget it you can’t get in or else if that 3-month period has 
gone by and you’re logged out and you can’t remember it, you can always 
go to help desk.” 
 
RN 9 “For work, no, banking yes.” 
 
 
Fourteen of the participants do not worry at all about their passwords at work.  
Those who do worry about it have low levels of worry related to media publications and 
placed more worry on their personal accounts such as banking and credit. 
Primary Theme 4: Orientation 
 The primary theme of orientation had four subthemes emerge that were analyzed 
including annual education, recent IT security, IT security talk on your unit, and 




Primary Theme 4: Orientation 
Participant Response 
RN 2 “In the orientation part of this you know that the flow of electronic 
medical records is really new.  
The overall orientation piece on the first orientation we did how do I track 
records. But as new systems come up we usually manage those. We are 
going to go through all the elements of those. So, I can say with each 
system I would probably have been oriented to that particular system and 
all you need to do will be getting in all of them. 
You know sometimes, especially with the when you first start using it, it’s 
difficult to know like exactly how you logged on. Sometimes you were 
just you know just take off, just log off like you would normally do with 
any other computer application without realizing its so different when you 
do that within the track records. So, I think it’s just plain orientations as 
you have new systems come up have them going and you have to get 
through too many systems. “ 
  
RN 5 “They do tell you to secure your stuff, don’t walk away from your 
computer, log off, but it’s not realistic.” 
 
RN 6 “That you need to sign off when you walk away from the computer not to 
leave your PIV cards, not to leave your PIV card in the computer.  It’s a 
personal identification vehicle or something like that and it has a chip in it 
or putting in the computer.” 
 
RN 17 “Oh! Sure, I mean there is paper you have to sign understanding that this 
was to you and you are bound to maintain its privacy, you aren’t to give it 
to anyone. All that I remember that vividly it was ingrained. Then as 
layers have come on, we had to do that again. Like when AcuDose came 
in we had to sign another paper saying this is yours.” 
 
 
Eight participants responded that there was no IT system when they started in 
nursing and the systems came along after they were working so they got oriented as the 
systems went live or they got no orientation and training.  Two reported that they had 
more detailed orientations with med scanning and medical record review and the final 10 
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participants having reported that they had limited variations of password and or log-off 
security measures as their orientation.  Annual education was reported as a frequent type 
of either IT education or IT security but was reported as brief in content.  Participants 




RN 1 “There are modules for annual training.” 
 
RN 5 “Each year there is some kind of on line training that has computer 
training or a refresher of some sort.  I believe it talks about log-off.” 
 
RN 12 “But we do have each year, we have education that we have to do online 
regarding confidentiality of emails and your passwords and like IT kind of 
security. That’s usually a yearly thing.” 
 
 
 Recent IT security education was identified by seven participants, five who 
discuss on-line modules or ULearn type of education.  The two RNs who mentioned they 
had mandatory education could not specify if there was IT security information within 





IT Security: Recent 
Participant Response 
RN 15 “The hospital has had us, I’d say in the past year do security education 
modules on the computer. Which requires a password that I can absolutely 
never, I can tell you the hospital tells you what your password is.  
It says, to put in your employee number then it tells you what your 
password will be by telling you to enter your hospital identifier code. 
Then your password and it’s your social security so that’s the password 
that you really don’t have to remember because the hospital tells you what 
it is when you are entering in to that. But we have had education models 
on IT security.” 
 
RN 17 “The mandatory education that we do, that’s all.” 
 
RN 5 “No, I don’t think, there might have been a blurb about it in our chart 
nurse class, but I don’t really remember it being anything significant.” 
 
RN 9 “Not to my knowledge, but there is a bunch of you learns going on right 
now that I haven’t completed. So, sometimes that will capture something 
new that’s happening.” 
 
 
 RNs discussed the education of IT security, or the lack of such, and the unit talk 
of IT security.  Fifteen participants had no talk on their units of IT security at all, five did 






IT Security Talk on Your Unit 
Participant Response 
RN 9 “Only when there was that pretty big breach a couple of years ago, and 
even that’s the only thing that really brought it up. But it’s not a daily 
conversation.” 
 
RN 5 “Yes, we have, there is one committee that deals with our IT staff, I’ve 
been able to call them. We get updates on that once a month in our emails 
and stuff and if anything changes we have education about that.” 
 
RN 12 “The only time it’s talked about is if we have a new nurse or a traveler 
start and they don’t have their IDs. Especially it’s normally requested at 
least 2 weeks in advance. But the day they start they can’t access anything 
and it takes hours to take their password up and running. It’s especially 
difficult for travelers because they only get a 2-day orientation to the unit. 
They spend half their day trying to get their password and that’s that time 
wasted.” 
 
RN 14 “Not really, not security so much as frustration of getting in and you 
know, getting in is a problem it’s like you always have the log in, log in, 




 Renaud and Goucher (2012) discussed that the likelihood of employees reading 
policies without encouragement and engagement by management is unlikely.  Policy 
practice and implementation takes management interaction, education, and oversight and 
in many cases involvement to assure that the employee is engaged in the process and 
knows the information.  In this subtheme, all participants share responses of no policy 
review for any kind of IT security or security practices for their unit. One participant 
responds that they make a periodic review in the department of an already established 
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policy so that they are aware of the contents for appropriate cell phone use and other 
devices on work property.   
Table 30 
Participate in IT Policy Review 
Participant Response 
RN 5 “No, I don’t even think that’s an opportunity for, I mean that I’m aware 
of.” 
 
RN 10 “No, but I have been reporting the issues that are a concern that I have 
about or someone would have someone else’s password that could raise 
an issue for colleagues about that.” 
 
RN 17 “No, just reviewing it with the staff because there were concerns about 
people sharing information on social media kind of stuff.  I mean we’ve 
done that, we’ve done a staff review of about what you are allowed to 
have share and what you are not allowed to share. I guess some issues that 
were pretty good so, we have review policies as a unit, go over. Share 
what's identifiable, what it’s not.” 
 
 
The participant responses related to orientation and each of the subthemes of education 
and policy participation represent many gaps in engagement with IT security.  RNs 
respond with little experience or recall related to IT security detail in each of the themes. 
Primary Theme 5: Call Who With IT Question 
 This primary theme identifies basic IT knowledge and engagement.  The 
knowledge begins with the elements of simple connections to information of support for 
IT security to the clinical area and clinical personnel when needed.  Do the RNs know 





Primary Theme 5: Call Who With IT Question 
Participant Response 
RN 4 “I would call, we have a main help desk call or line we can call, it’s 24/7 
would help me.” 
 
RN 9 “I would probably call the help desk first. I know there is a security 
officer, I’d have to investigate on how to get a hold of them. But I really 
couldn’t tell you who it is.” 
 
RN 15 “I know I should know this answer because it's part of the education 
module. But I don’t know very specific name or title at this point. I know 
yearly I do the module and then I quickly forget it because I never need to 
know it. But I would have, I would probably go to clinical director first to 
remind me who that person is or the director of our unit and then they will 
point me in the right direction. Or I could always call a help desk to, like 
if there is something later that I want to know immediately I'm sure they 
can point me in the right direction.” 
 
RN 16 “I would call the computer tech person. I'm not sure what that person’s 
title is but I think maybe I think a computer tech person. I would call that 
person and ask him or her what to do.” 
 
 
All participants would either call the help desk or IT personnel.  There were four 
participants who were not completely sure who to call if they had concerns or a question 





Whose Role for IT Security 
Participant Response 
RN 2 “I think it’s really everybody’s responsibility but if you see that there is an 
issue, they need you to confront it, or they need you to report it. So, I 
think it’s kind of everybody’s job but I know that there are some people 
that are ultimately responsible for that like the privacy officer in IT and 
those types of things. So, I think it’s like everybody.” 
 
RN 11 “Definitely the IT department, clinical engineering. I’m sure help desk 
would probably be involved.” 
 
RN 1 “Well, I think it should be your hospital system, they have to make sure 
that it is able to be accessed by only authorized users. I think that it’s my 
role to protect my actual access. But I think as a whole it should be your 
IT department from your hospital to prevent outsiders from trying to get 
in.” 
 
RN 7 “I don’t know, we just call the helpdesk for everything. So, I’m not 
exactly sure who maintains the security but.” 
 
 
Participants responded in six categories for who was responsible for IT security 
and some included several within their same response.  Responsibilities identified were 
for everyone (4), the hospital (2), IT (10), my responsibility (2), record security analyst 
(1), the RN (3), and not sure (1).  Those who responded that it was “my responsibility” or 
the RN, suggested that it was their responsibility to maintain only their access with their 
password secure.  During discussion of maintaining system security respondents 





Concern System is Not Secure 
Participant Response 
RN 1 “I was a little concerned when that breach did occur I don’t know the full 
details of it. I do know that it was one incident and not system wide. But I 
do think that the hospital took it extremely seriously and worked with 
caution in preventing it from happening again.” 
 
RN 15 “Actually, it's secure, the only vulnerability I can see is just through 
human error you know that I'm probably guilty of is by leaving my 
computer open and that’s the only way I can think of. I don’t know how 
and it seems to me like I don’t know that it's or anything although I do 
know the physician can access all the information too. So, I guess it is 
open to the web so I guess it's technically open to vulnerability if it's on 
the web. But I assume we have now security team taking care of us.” 
 
RN 18 “Sure yeah. Having some close family members in information 
technology that have been visited sometimes at work knowing that our 
operating system is a little bit older and isn’t supported at this point by 
Microsoft. That's a concern and that’s really the biggest one. Other than 
that, sometimes the badging situation can be of concern if people lend 
their badges out to go get coffees. Or lend their badges out to get to 
medication room or something like that. So, if they logged in once with 
their passwords that the badge can find into any computer with just 
tapping it on by the computer.” 
 
RN 8 “I don’t know that any system is secure anymore, I mean everybody is 
getting hacked, I mean the big hospital system I work in was a victim of 
being hacked. Every time you turn around someone is being hacked. Or I 
don’t know, I think the more every security thing we develop there is 
someone who is just that much smarter and finds a way around.”  
 
RN 9 “I don’t think anything is secure in today’s world anymore. Like my 
banking account got hacked, my credit card got hacked, my little kitty 
credit card hacked. I was having charges all over the place. So, I don’t 





Although the majority of participants (14) believed the system is secure.  The six who 
were concerned about security of system had some experience wither directly or 
indirectly with a system problem or breach.  If there was a concern or report of an IT 
issue was the participant’s confidence maintained. 
Table 34 
Confidence That Concern is Taken Seriously 
Participant Response 
RN 11 “Yes, they are very good with addressing any concerns that we have.” 
 
RN 17 “Oh! yeah. I felt that there was not the same timely response we would 
expect to issues. Because I thought that this was pretty serious like “Hair 
is on fire” we need to deal with this now and they were like, “Yeah we 
know.” 
 
RN 18 “Yes, every time we call them they actually have to open up a ticket and it 
gives us an email saying that the tickets’ been opened. Then it’ll tell us 
when the ticket’s been closed meaning that everything should be 
resolved.” 
 
RN 20 “I think it depends on who answers the call on the help desk, it depends 
on the staff member that I would get in touch with.” 
 
 
Within this subtheme 19 participants expressed that they had confidence and one 
answered that “it depends on who answers at the help desk”.  The depth of the connection 
with confidence seemed to be at the help desk level.  This is the level of connection for 
the RNs to IT security. 
Primary Theme 6: Rate Security 
 Within this Primary theme of rate security, there are subthemes of are you 
expected to know IT security, is your job better with IT security, and what is your 
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teammates practice.  The perception of security level that the RN is exposed to along with 
sense of job improvement impact the expressed intention of the RNs application of IT 
security. 
Table 35 
Primary Theme 6: Rate Security 
Participant Response 
RN 2 “I feel like that data is probably pretty secure but out and about I’m not 
sure. Because anyone can really look at the screens. I mean as you walk 
by if you really wanted to you can look at the things so something like 
that. You know based on, how kind of area that you're in, it’s probably the 
level different levels things just on the screen. I think different places in 
the clinical area probably more secure like the conference rooms are fairly 
secure. The nurse’s station, maybe a medium level because the traffic 
through there. You have different types of people who go through the 
nurses’ station, nursing positions, different disciplines. They kind of walk 
through nurse’s station and not the hallways, which I feel are pretty open 
with visitors and all types of persons. So, I think that’s probably not as 
secure in the other areas.” 
 
RN 13 “I would say it’s mid-scale.” 
 
RN 14 “I think 8 out of 10, the people that are being careful but they are not 
ultra-worried about it.” 
 
RN 18 “If 10 is very secure and 1 is not very secure I would say my unit would 
probably be 6 in my opinion.” 
 
 
Ratings have to do with location and access of unit.  This perception is about real 
time access to computer screens and computers.  Two respondents rated their unit at the 
highest rating saying they would be 10 out of 10 or most secure.  All others (18) said they 
would be moderate to moderately high secure because they are very careful with HIPAA 
but they do leave their computers and they had not really thought about several aspects of 
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password development prior to this interview.  Consistent with the flow of discussion this 
subtheme of the RN being expected to know IT security emerged. 
Table 36 
Are You Expected to Know IT Security  
Participant Response 
RN 7 “No, I mean not the details, nitty-gritty but I mean maintaining a 
password and making sure that no one has access and to that extend yes.” 
 
RN 8 “I think we should know the basics, how to protect yourself, you know, 
protect your patient’s information.” 
 
RN 15 “I don’t know that we need to know the ins and outs of it but I know we 
are expected to as far as we are concerned and using the system to try to 
keep it secure.” 
 
RN 19 “The only aspect that I would be expected to do is have a secure password 
and log off the stuff. Other than that, we wouldn’t be required to know 
how to do it.” 
 
 
Eight respondents identified that they should know some IT security but did not 
or were not able to define what that would include.  They suggested they should know 
some basics or password safety.  I had wondered if that answer was based on the content 






Is Your Job Better With More Security 
Participant Response 
RN 6 “It doesn’t make my job better but it keeps information private. I would 
think that the patient’s information would be a better chance of it 
remaining private.” 
 
RN 13 “I feel like if it was more secure it would make my job harder, I would 
spend more time on that rather than patient care and that would not 
necessarily be better. But if there is a way they can make it secure and fast 
then it would be different.” 
 
RN 16 “I think I’d definitely feel more comfortable. I think feeling more 
comfortable will make me feel more confident and then I'll perform best I 
can.” 
 
RN 20 “I don’t know if it would change specifically nursing practice just making 
things better, would make the patient safer so then, yeah, I would think 
that would make my job better.” 
 
 
 None of the participants said that IT security would directly make their job better 
but eight said that it would make them more confident or make the patients safer and then 
indirectly make their job better.  Given the perception of impact on their job because of 








RN 5 “Like I said before we all share our badges to sign on to the computers to 
chart stuff, work, we’re in the room and we’re already logged on and to 
our patients something is happening and you need more help in the room 
and they’ll come on, if I am already logged on because I’m in there, then 
they’ll just start charting under my account or something.” 
 
RN 12 “I believe that if that would make our job easier, they would share them - 
I do share them.” 
 
RN 17 “There might be a few that are careless because they are careless in many 
things.” 
 
RN 20 “Right, yeah, I mean I’ve definitely overheard people sharing their 
information it’s not necessarily to log into the record, but its, “Hey, can 
you check my PTO or can you log in to check if my paycheck was 
deposited.” Usually the same log in you use for all of that is the same that 
you would use for the charting system. In theory, they could log in under 
you in the charting system too. So, it’s kind of a bridge.” 
 
 
Responses include nine that identify they are aware of sharing among their peers, 
three that are aware of badge scanning shared accounts, and five that believe there is no 
sharing of passwords or accounts within their departments among teammates. 
Primary Theme 7: Association With Hacking 
There are three subthemes in the primary theme of association with hacking.  The 
three subthemes are impact to employees, impact to patients, and impact to organizations. 
The standard responses within the primary theme of association with hacking seemed to 
be rambling intertwining information from personal concern to work and inclusive of 
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mainstream media mania.  Several participants admitted “I just don’t know…” as they 
discussed hacking. 
Table 39 
Primary Theme 7: Association With Hacking 
Participant Response 
RN 15 “Somewhere I know like I said I don’t know how the ins and outs of 
system actually works. But I'm sure smarter minds of mine with more 
technical survey can maybe back engineer or reverse engineer into a 
system but I don’t know how that works. I don’t know how to do that 
myself.” 
 
RN 16 “I mean we don’t really know everybody we work with, we think we 
might but you have to protect yourself at all times in the world we live in. 
I just think that it's just a responsibility of each person. If hacking happens 
I think some of these careless things could really cause that to go on. We 
have to be just cautious all the time.” 
 
RN 17 “I don’t know enough about that hacking, how that occurs, I assume that 
if you are not careful it would be well likely that someone would use it. 
From a hacking perspective but I really think the hacker people aren’t like 
nurses taking care of patients in general but again maybe that’s the 
delusion.” 
 
RN 18 “If another coworker knows someone else’s password, it could do a lot of 
detrimental things. Be it just sabotaging that nurse’s documentation or 
undoing documentation that was done. Or possibly charting things that 
weren’t true or weren’t done.” 
 
 
Thoughts about hacking are not based on anything deeper than changing patient 
records or what is known about HIPAA and patient privacy.  There was no response 
included about social engineering or actual hacking principles.  With this as a premise the 




Impact to Employees 
Participant Response 
RN 1 “I think the impact would be fear and I think that people would be 
probably a little more protective of their own private access, yeah.”  
 
RN 17 “I think it would be terrible. I think that I would just probably take the 
system down for a while and we are terrible at down time. Because we’ve 
got to rely so much on computer even though I liked paper. We are no 
longer set up to run in a paper world so it would be really hard.  
I get the extent of the hack would be, the extent of the effect. If it took the 
system down for days and that would be rebuilt from who knows where if 
we lost data, it's irretrievable as far as I could see. I could not have to 
chart on someone 2 days after I took care of them.” 
 
RN 18 “I think there could be disciplinary action up to termination depending on 
the circumstances of how the password got taken.” 
 
RN 19 “It depends on what information was hacked, you know if the get your 
financial stuff they can get information about your bank accounts, taxes. 




 The RNs have a strong sense that there are consequences to hacking and are 
expressive that hacking is detrimental to employees.  With continued discussions of 
consequences related to hacking the RNs passionately discussed aspects of potential 
impact to employees and patients as if they were intertwined.  In several cases the RNs 
spoke about themselves using the hospital for themselves and their families for healthcare 
thus identifying the blurred lines between employee and patient as they see themselves as 





Impact to Patients 
Participant Response 
RN 3 “Very impactful, their medical record it’s the highest regard of privacy 
and we should respect that and in no way, jeopardize their sense that their 
health information is secure.” 
 
RN 11 “Gosh! That would probably be a nightmare. As a nurse, you look at your 
orders and you go off of your orders. Say for example the hacker would 
get into e-record and put like this bogus orders and that can definitely put 
your patient at risk or some serious injury.” 
 
RN 14 “I guess they would be able to change records, you know to change your 
data. Would patients have confidence?” 
 
RN 16 “Oh! I just think HIPAA would be out the window for one thing. Patient 
information would go to hands where it shouldn’t be going. I think it 
would be disastrous.” 
 
 
Again, the RNs have a strong sense that there are consequences to hacking and 
are expressive that hacking is detrimental to patients.  While their focus is on patient 
information and the consequence of hacking on patient information they did make a 
correlation to patient trust in the care givers and the hospital.  The RNs also made a 
connection to the hackers’ abilities to gain patient personal identifiers and being able to 
capture that information for use to gain the patient identity for misuse.  Some expressed 
public concern for hacking similar to what Kwon & Johnson (2014) described about 
public awareness and concern of hacking are becoming more prominent. 
The RNs expressed that the consequences to the organization would be significant 
and detrimental in all aspects including public relations, community, business, financial, 
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health plan relationships, and many other aspects.  Those who are employees to 
organizations who would face this type of hacking felt he or she would personally be 
affected.  In all cases, they reported the effects would be disparaging. 
Table 42 
Impact to Organizations 
Participant Response 
RN 3 “Very detrimental, its end results would be detrimental to the patients, to 
the staff and publicity wise it would be negative publicity.” 
 
RN 11 “I would definitely think, thinking the benefits I get from my hospital like 
healthcare, my salary if they were to kind of meddle with that in the 
public and community that could basically ruin my life. They would be 
stealing my salary and my healthcare benefits. So, it certain would be 
catastrophic.” 
RN 14 “It would be bad. Bad name. I can’t think of the word, but bad PR or bad 
messages to the outside community that you know it’s not safe.” 
 
RN 20 “Loss of trust from the community, because there is that expectation that 
their information is secure especially things like health information. So, 
you would definitely lose that trust from people.” 
 
 
Primary Theme 8: Other Security Thoughts 
Other security thoughts came from an open-ended question that allowed the participants 
to discuss other IT topics that may be connected to this questionnaire or security of IT in 





Primary Theme 8: Other Security Thoughts 
Participant Response 
RN 1 “Well, I mean even like IT security nowadays people can badge in for the 
doors, for parking, for food. We actually had an incident where somebody 
lost their badge but it was still getting used. They actually tracked the 
doors it went through and that’s how they ended up finding it. I guess it 
was somebody trying to get to the information desk. But they still used 
that badge.” 
RN 6 “I’m just kind of curious that you pick up the phone, you call someone 
and they get in on your account, there is no verification that who you’re 
speaking with is actually someone legit.” 
 
RN 11 “I would just say maybe, like the point where I gave you where the people 
that have used to work on the unit now work elsewhere, but they still 
come back and work. If there could be some kind of, I don’t want to say 
universal password, but they should still be able to come and get into the 
system if they come back to work, in their old unit.” 
 
RN 20 “I always wonder what, how they determine the amount of time between 
password changes, why do they say it needs to be every 35 days or why 
does it need to be every 60 days? I mean do they just pull that number out 
of the air or is that backed up by something? I always wonder that.” 
 
 
This category of thoughts was helpful to consider other security issues and serves 
to help with future research ideas and those security issues that bother nurses related to IT 
security.  This category of information may be helpful in operational situations related to 
security gap assessments.  Additional topics included point of care testing scanning and 
badge sharing for ease of use, mobile devices used in workflow and how they help or 
inhibit workflow, different vendor systems and how they do not interact 
(interoperability), and other badge access uses. 
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There were no identified discrepant cases that were factored into the analysis. 
Member checking, adequate analysis of data, absence of researcher bias, and minimizing 
conflict of interest reduce the opportunity for discrepant responses (Peredaryenko & 
Krauss, 2013).  
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
The qualitative case study method allowed for construct validity to be established 
through evidence from the chain of sources described by Amerson (2011), including 
member checking, pattern matching, explanation building and using logic models.  The 
participants’ ability to discuss and reiterate the important aspects of the informed consent 
while meeting prior to the interview and the member checking activities were two very 
important aspects of credibility.  Engagement was critical to a successful interview and 
part of my role was to take notes, of which the participant was notified prior to the start.  
If I noticed that the participant was distracted in any way by my notetaking, I would stop 
during the interview and later jot notes following the interview conclusion so as not to 
interfere with the participants thought and concentration.  Immediately following each 
interview, I would make any notes required and record additional thoughts and 
impressions that I had gathered from my insights of responses that I might have had of 
the participants expressed feelings or engagement mannerisms so that I could apply that 
information into the memo section of NVivo v11.  These notes served to help clarify 
accuracy in transcription and questions that arose during member checking by myself and 




The interview questionnaire was submitted to an expert panel prior to use and was 
revised and validated for the study increasing the relevance to the study, appropriateness 
to the topic, accuracy in content, and clarity to the population.  Bengtsson (2016) 
discussed the importance of validating the questionnaire through the use of an expert 
panel in the process of qualitative research, as it lends credibility to the process.  The 
constructs of UTAUT served as the foundation for the research questions.  The use of 
UTAUT allowed for an established protocol incorporated into the study design and 
became the supportive structure for external validity of this qualitative case study 
(Amerson, 2011).  The framework of UTAUT and each of the constructs being used 
within this research study were established and validated and did support the work in this 
research study.  Thomas and Magilvy (2011) discussed that transferability of a study is 
applying research findings from one group or population to another.  The findings from 
this study are expected to have applicability to other clinical populations within the 
healthcare arena. 
Dependability 
Dependability was assured through comparative hand notes taken during the 
interview and the audio recordings that were recorded and transcribed verbatim with 
review following transcription.  The researcher conducted repeated reviews of the audio 
recordings.  The purpose of the repeated reviews was to improve interpretation and 
identify cues related to the lived experience that will be shared.  These were compared to 
the notes related to expressed feelings and engagement attempting to capture the 
138 
 
associated lived experiences that were not verbally described but were expressed 
nonverbally.  All elements of data collected, researcher notes, audio recordings, and 
transcripts, were input to NVivo v11 software so that accurate and dependable results 
were analyzed. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability was maintained during the interview process, coding, and 
analyzing process of the study.  The neutrality of the qualitative study, is achieved when 
each of the following have been addressed according to Noble and Smith (2015); (a) truth 
value, (b) consistency, and (c) applicability.  This was often difficult to maintain during 
the interview process because of the casual nature of the interviews.  Knowing the 
importance of confirmability, I would review ahead of each interview and remind myself 
to stay focused on the participant’s story.  This assisted me in maintaining my neutral 
position when topics arose with any link to a philosophical position, or experience that 
might be associated or similar to mine that triggered an instinct to discuss or respond.  
The multiple reviews of the recordings also helped to reveal, eliminate, or separate, any 
personal response during review, coding, or analysis of the data.  Careful and thoughtful 
bracketing was used during the coding phase of data analysis.  The bracketing for this 
study was conducted according to Tufford and Newman (2012), and Sorsa et al. (2015), 
on several different levels and very thoughtfully to allow for reflexivity and 
understanding.  Each phase of the data analysis required a thoughtful and nonjudgmental 




The qualitative study is enhanced when internal validity is supported with 
saturation (Fusch & Ness, 2015).  The population of this study included 20 participants.  
Data saturation occurred at participant 14 with emergence of common themes and 
subthemes concluding.  According to Fusch and Ness, saturation is reached when there is 
no new information, no new coding, no new themes, and an ability to replicate the study.  
Although saturation had been reached at 14 participants the additional six participants 
enhanced the data rich responses obtained and became “balancers” of subthemes that had 
emerged.  Meaning was enhanced because of the additional respondents in some 
categories to assure that they were subthemes rather than primary themes.  The last six 
participants added to the responses equalizing and enhancing thematic developments. 
Study Results 
The eight primary themes and all subthemes that had emerged were discussed in 
the data analysis section above.  Each of the first six primary themes have UTAUT 
constructs that are coordinated with that theme, see Figure 3.  This study was designed to 
answer the overarching research question, what are RNs’ perceptions, expressed 
intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT security?  I was able to answer this question 
by first answering each of the supporting questions. 
RQ 1 
RQ 1: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the performance expectancy of IT security practice? 
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To answer this research question related to the performance expectancy the 
emerged primary and subthemes from primary themes 2, 3, 5, and 6 were used.  The RN 
perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors include a mixed use of 
performance expectancy of IT security practice.  The RNs self-reported role in the usage 
of security practices is dependent on the situation in the clinical environment.  The RNs 
found it easy to use passwords but frustrating to repeatedly log-in using a password when 
required.  The RNs did not share passwords but there was a subset that shared accounts 
through a modern method of sharing through badge swipe sharing.  No password 
exchange is required but the badge, registered for authentication via single sign on (SSO), 
is shared between RNs for workflow efficiencies.  The belief that the RNs’ have is that 
the process will help them maintain aspects of their job that pertain to expediting the 
patient care process, enhance medical record documentation, and did not see it as a 
system security concern.  The RNs did not identify that there would be a direct 
improvement in their job but they did describe that if security made things better for the 
patient then indirectly it would be better.  Exploration of how the RNs’ perceived their 
role in IT security showed that they were not well connected with the IT support and did 
not have a strong understanding of who was or should be responsible for IT security at 
the front line or at the organization.  The perception of security was at least midlevel or 
higher in all work units even though RNs reported that their teammates shared passwords 
and did not log-off of their computers when they walk away.  The use of security 
practices was described as relatively easy to use but were not put into place as part of the 
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regular workflow.  The workplace in each unit is influenced by the security practices and 
may be impacted by these practices. 
RQ 2 
RQ 2: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the effort expectancy related to the IT security practice? 
To answer this research question related to the effort expectancy the emerged 
primary and subthemes from primary themes 2 and 3 were used.  Effort expectancy is 
associated with how easy it is to use the security practices.  There were no aspects of 
security discussed by the participants that were described as difficult to use.  There were 
aspects of inconvenience, frustration, interference with care, and plain annoying.  The 
identified RN perception related to the security practices and ease of use have a direct 
correlation with the utilization of those security practices that describes the ability for 
reporting no sharing of passwords.  Nineteen of twenty of the RNs reporting in this study 
use the SSO badge programed authentication for log-in.  The SSO allows for ease of log-
in for a large number of systems that the RNs access.  The aspect of difficulty is 
accessing records and information as rapidly with multiple RNs while immediate or 
critical situations occur, those were the times when deviations from security practices 
were reported. 
RQ 3 
RQ 3: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the social influence related to the IT security practice? 
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To answer this research question related to the effort expectancy the emerged 
primary and subthemes from primary themes 1, 2, and 6 were used.  Social influence is 
the method for which the employee perceives their peers or significant other relevant 
professionals in the clinical environment believe they should be using the security 
practices.  Within this study, the RNs described that the teammates they work with did 
walk away from their computers without log-off and they do share passwords, however 
they themselves discussed their behaviors which were different.  The practice of walking 
away from the computer without log-off was described as a cultural norm.  The RNs 
described that they would not personally share a password.  The RNs’ perception of 
social influence in the clinical setting related to varying levels of social support which 
permits a cultural norm of computer walk away with no log-off, mishandling of accounts 
by badge sharing, and other security issues. 
RQ 4 
RQ 4: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors 
of the facilitating conditions of the IT security practice? 
To answer this research question related to the facilitating conditions the emerged 
primary and subthemes from primary themes 1, 2, 4, and 6 were used.  The RNs 
discussed the operational support of each other as a strong facilitating condition that led 
to breach of IT security.  Facilitating conditions, as perceived by the RNs, included the 
technical methods that support using the security practices.  The safeguards in place to 
protect security IT including the auto log-off on the computers for those who walk away 
without log-off was identified as an inhibitor to patient care because it required frequent 
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log-in ultimately causing delays to care.  The other facilitating condition that is applied to 
the IT security used by RNs is SSO.  The emerged theme identified that SSO was used to 
breach IT security by sharing authenticated badges for account sharing, med room access, 
and facility purchases.  Orientation and education were limited so would not be 
considered as a facilitation of conditions.  The RNs did not participate and were not 
engaged in policy development.  Overall engagement with IT for support was limited as 
well creating another aspect of limitation toward facilitating conditions. 
RQ: Overarching 
With each of the supporting questions answered, the overarching question can 
now be answered.  What are RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported 
behaviors of IT security?  RNs perceptions of IT security include a very basic level of 
what security definitions include aside from privacy and HIPAA.  The expressed 
intentions of the RN population responding to this study included a positive desire to do 
what would protect themselves, the organization, and most importantly the patients they 
care for.  The self-reported behaviors of the RNs included mishandling of IT security 
through walking away from the computer without log-off, poor development of 
passwords, lack of password change for long periods of time, sharing of accounts through 
SSO authenticated badges, and sharing log-on information for mobile and point of care 
equipment. 
I have cross walked the UTAUT constructs used in this study along with the 
primary and subthemes that emerged from data analysis.  By using this method, a robust 
review of the lived experience of the RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-
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reported behaviors of IT security practices was conducted.  This review allows for insight 
into the security practice in the healthcare work environment.   
The inquiry and collection of demographic data was specifically designed to align 
with the literature that has been established including variances between male and 
female, age, and educational preparation.  In the literature review, each of these 
demographic items had been shown to have a relationship to adoption of technology and 
change (Venkatesh, 2003).  These demographic items were not found in the data analysis 
to play a role in nor have a relationship to the emergence of the primary or subthemes 
within this study.  I was unable to make any direct alignment from demographic data to 
the construct themes of UTAUT aimed toward use behavior. 
Summary 
Albarrak (2012) , Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015), and Medlin et al. (2008) each 
showed mishandling of IT security in their quantitative studies.  The use of exploration 
with the case study format in this study allowed for findings that add to the knowledge of 
IT security handling in clinical settings.  The RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and 
self-reported behaviors of IT security was able to be applied with insight into their lived 
experience of using the IT security within their clinical setting.  A discussion of the 
interpretation of research findings, limitations of the study, recommendations for future 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perception of the 
registered nurse (RN) within four of the constructs of the unified theory of acceptance 
and usage of technology (UTAUT) that are specific to use behavior (Venkatesh et al., 
2003).  Insight into the lived experiences of RNs related to information technology (IT) 
security was the benefit of this study.  The experiences and perceptions of the RNs were 
analyzed as they relate to the UTAUT constructs of performance expectancy, effort 
expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions.  Using UTAUT as the 
theoretical framework, the following overarching research question was used for this 
study: What are RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT 
security?  The findings included that RNs’ perceptions of IT security include a very basic 
level of IT security definition aside from privacy and HIPAA.  Their expressed intentions 
included a positive desire to act in a manner that would protect themselves, the 
organization, and most importantly the patients they care for.  The self-reported behaviors 
of the RNs include mishandling of IT security through several venues, including walking 
away from the computer without log-off, poor development of passwords, lack of 
password change for long periods of time, sharing of accounts through single sign on 
(SSO) authenticated badges and sharing of those authenticated badges, and sharing log-
on information for mobile and point of care equipment.  Within Chapter 5, I address the 
interpretations, implications, and potential applications of the findings along with 
limitations and conclusions of the work as well as avenues for future research.  Finally, 
implications for social change are discussed. 
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Interpretation of Findings 
The findings included that RNs’ perceptions of IT security include a very basic 
level of IT security definition aside from privacy and HIPAA.  Their expressed intentions 
included a positive desire to act in a manner that would protect themselves, the 
organization, and most importantly the patients they care for.  The self-reported behaviors 
of the RNs include mishandling of IT security through several venues including walking 
away from the computer without log-off, poor development of passwords, lack of 
password change for long periods of time, sharing of accounts through SSO authenticated 
badges and sharing of those authenticated badges, and sharing log-on information for 
mobile and point of care equipment. 
The RNs expressed trust of their teammates and offered discussion of protecting 
their environments, almost justifying no log-off and sharing of accounts or badges.  This 
is consistent with research by Box and Pottas (2013) who discussed the general 
functioning of healthcare professionals is naturally within an honorable and trusting 
community.  Those healthcare professionals, because of their trusting nature, have a low 
need for security sensitivity leaving them with a limited sense of need for IT security 
awareness. 
The majority of RNs discussed the use of SSO.  But even with SSO, they still had 
additional application for which they were required to have additional and separate 
passwords for authentication.  Milenković et al. (2013), discussed the issue of users 
having to remember multiple passwords and that would most likely cause the creation of 
insecure passwords, forgetting passwords, or cause wasting time with multiple 
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authentications.  Findings supported this with identification of password development 
occurring from familiar categories with rare to no password change.  Systems including 
Pixis and AcuDose, both dispensing systems most often used for medications, were 
reported to have 2-step authentication of password and biometric access (fingerprint).  
Password and biometric authentication were both methods described of gaining access to 
systems securely (Li et al., 2014). 
Password sharing was not discovered within this study among the participants.  
However, they did share their lived experiences of password sharing scenarios having 
occurred on their units among teammates.  They described actual workflow and patient 
situations that they believed might be a reason for password sharing.  Albarrak (2012), 
Belanger (2011), Cazier and Medlin (2006), Rajarajan et al. (2014), Sharma and 
Sugumaran (2011), and Tam et al. (2010) all discussed the difficulty of protecting the 
organization relying on a password.  They suggested that it is the people who must be the 
strength of the IT security.  From an organizational perspective, the IT system is 
composed of three parts: technology, management, and the people (Cheng et al., 2013).  
The people or employees remain the weakest link in security and password management 
even though there have been strides in technology systems (Medlin et al., 2008; & Tam et 
al., 2010). 
The RNs found it to be a cultural norm to walk away from a computer without 
log-off.  They reported that not only did they do it to care for their patients and to do 
other clinical tasks but they also reported that their teammates within their unit do it.  The 
front-line culture of the organizations represented in this study has either allowed or 
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evolved to a position that there is a low-level response to IT security.  Kwon and Johnson 
(2014) demonstrated that there were three levels of security practice adoption based on 
culture: leaders, followers, and laggers.  Those identified organizations were noted as 
leaders were training and managing risk and breach incidents.  The RNs in this study 
reported that they did not recall much IT security orientation, they have very little IT 
security training and education other than annual mandatory training for which they had 
little recall of the IT security within that training, and they had no talk of IT security on 
their units. 
Evaluating and managing the human factors is one of the key aspects of IT 
security.  Human factors are frequently mentioned in the literature when discussing IT 
security and often through history have been referred to as the weakest link (Arce, 2003, 
Ferguson et al., 2011, Tam et al., 2010).  Negligence is often cited as a human factor that 
affects the organization.  Negligence can fall into several categories of security risk.  
Kruger and Anschutz (2013) discussed the insider negligence at the root of data breaches. 
Kwon and Johnson (2014) discussed that the healthcare industry faces two weak links the 
internal threat and the external threat.  Two weak links exist because healthcare has not 
adequately ramped up to deal with the security risks through investment allowing for 
remainders of uncertainty. 
I found that the RNs had moderate awareness of IT security and that their 
awareness was targeted toward HIPAA and protecting the electronic medical record.  
They were certainly also aware that there was an obligation to authenticate through 
password or SSO to gain access to any application or the electronic medical record.  
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Harris and Furnell (2012) had previously identified the same that the employees of 
organizations have been found to have only moderate to low awareness when asked about 
behaviors required for security compliance.  Albarrak (2012) found that nurses were 
deficient in security awareness and the importance of overall IT security in relation to 
patient data. 
Throughout the preparation for this study, the design, and approval there were 
many discussions with colleagues, my committee, and experts in the field about the use 
of Simpson (1996) as a reference and citing the discussion related to the lack of policy 
and procedure, education, and oversight from leadership within the organizations that 
allow for breaches in the security.  I have found that with this sample, even if there is 
policy out there, the RNs are not engaged, they have never participated in policy 
development for IT security, the orientation could not be recalled, and education was 
reported as limited if at all.  Of the education that was reported very little could be 
articulated.  Other than the RNs knowing that they needed to use a password, they knew 
very little about IT security. 
The primary themes with subthemes and UTAUT constructs were each described 
in Chapter 4 and are further expounded upon in this chapter.  In consideration of all 
findings and how actions in response to those findings might be applied to healthcare 
with associated impacts, I present the diagram in Figure 4.  This diagram identifies the 
three aspects of the research question (a) expressed intentions, (b) perceptions, and (c) 
self-reported behaviors as they emerged from the findings.  The influencing factors are 
identified at a conceptual level including (a) limited orientation and education, (b) lack of 
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policy participation, (c) lack of understanding, and (d) workflow needs.  Finally, the 
implicated risk of self-reported behaviors of IT security mishandling and the direct 
impacts. 
 
Figure 4. Diagram of findings.  Reveals findings from A Qualitative Exploration of the 
Security Practices of Registered Nurses identifying emerged themes within the three 
aspects of the research question (a) expressed intentions, (b) perceptions, and (c) self-
reported behaviors. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
Limitations of this study include that the study sample of RNs represented a 
single professional nursing organization and therefore lacks generalizability.  The results 
from this population represent the security behaviors that can be provided in a limited 
descriptive presentation but do not become predictive of the future behaviors of other RN 
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populations due to multiple contributing factors within each geographic region and 
organization.  Additionally, the study participants were self-reporting.  Limitations of 
self-reported results may contain bias, are not able to be verified, and are influenced by 
past or current situational experience (Brutus et al., 2013).  The members may have 
experience with frequent surveying by their hospitals, other agencies, and other 
researchers of which I would have not known and that may create the limitation of a 
lower yield in an interest of participating in this study.  The potential for eliminating a 
group who would normally participate in research due to over survey may have 
eliminated a specific subpopulation.  Lastly, the RN’s concern for the identification or 
potential for leakage of information potentially leading to disciplinary action due to 
variance from policy may yield false or dishonest response, limited response, or 
nonresponse to the questions within the interview process may be a limitation.  The 
combination of self-report and fear of discipline might have skewed or influenced 
response honesty. 
Recommendations 
 The outcomes of this cases study were different than I had anticipated as I had 
believed based on the literature that password sharing would become the primary area of 
IT security mishandling.  Perhaps because of changing times and improvements in 
security and “ease-of-use” technology, the modern method of sharing accounts and 
expediting workflow is badge sharing with authenticated badges.  The computer 
walkaway without log-off was another area of IT security mishandling that was prevalent 
in the clinical area.  These two aspects of variance from IT security seem to be the result 
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of mismatch with workflow for patient care and need for emergent or rapid 
documentation. 
Future Research 
The IT security mishandling behaviors of RNs provide fertile ground for future 
research in the areas associated with their work environment and practice patterns as they 
relate to IT security.  These research studies could be done from several perspectives, 
including (a) observational workflows and associated IT security, (b) observations of 
what actually happens during the periods of mishandling, (c) timing of IT security 
processes used in the clinical setting, (d) actual nurse use of accounts and type of 
accounts with types of access to each account, and (e) comparative assessment of what IT 
believes is happening/management believes is happening/and what is really happening in 
the clinical area (perception/reality mismatch). 
 Orientation, education, and policy were identified as areas of weakness or not 
present.  Future research in this area could include actual tracking of education and later 
evaluation of recall and assessment of usage.  Inclusion of engagement of nursing within 
the unit environment or relationship between IT and nursing with metrics related to IT 
security knowledge and usage.  Evaluation of nursing involvement in IT security policy 
development with comparison to the result of IT security implementation and usage in 
the clinical environment. 
 Future research in the area of hacking would be to better understand what RNs 
learn and understand about hacking or what actions might lead to hacking.  In this study, 
they had a mindset on specific topics that may have limited their openness on the topic of 
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hacking.  In depth inquiry into effects of hacking might serve as an area of future 
research related to the populations that healthcare organizations support and serve. 
Implications  
Positive social change as it relates to IT security has the potential to make a 
substantial impact in the healthcare arena.  Following the findings of this study it is 
evident that the implications for social change remain ever present as they had been 
described earlier, with an essential need for protection of systems, including patient 
information and employee information.  Any loss of integrity to the healthcare electronic 
systems allows for the loss of confidence by the public.  Chen et al. (2013) discussed the 
complexity in the healthcare systems as being the cause for a lack of security that may 
allow for risk behavior related to electronic medical record handling.  I previously 
presented the concept of the public perception of the protected health information 
security and confidence of the security of their individual files being of high importance.  
In the findings of this study, I was able to identify that the employees had a concern over 
their employee information being maintained securely both as an employee and as a 
patient if they were insured and cared for by the same organization.  Organizational 
leadership teams will need to strategically plan for IT security to be incorporated into 
frontline workflow so that everyone is part of security management. 
Significance to Practice  
The findings of this study substantiated that for the RNs, as with most individuals, 
healthcare providers, and administrators, the aspects of security include the electronic 
medical record and the aspects of HIPAA, but they do not often think of the operational 
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systems and management objectives that are required to secure the systems.  The IT 
security system for organizational information is large and complex.  The RNs were not 
aware of the complexity of the systems.  The workflows did not match the IT security 
processes.  Organizational leaders must manage and safeguard the employee practices as 
they relate to IT security, including workflows and authentication practices.  When this 
mismatch occurs, a gap analysis will be helpful to reestablish risk assessment.  Insight 
into how RNs practice and relate to IT security influences the development and security 
of system builds.  This stronger insight and understanding of the RNs’ use of the security 
applications will allow administrative and IT oversight to create an opportunity for 
engagement of the RNs in the development of the policy and procedure.  Engaging the 
RNs will provide for policies to become more nurse, clinician, employee, and patient care 
friendly so that the healthcare organizations are less susceptible to risk.  Security 
compliance will increase if barriers to using the IT security can be minimized.  Insight 
into the RNs’ perception was gained during this study and will be helpful in developing 
stronger processes. 
Significance to Theory 
In the workflow of nursing practice, the role of maintaining IT security is an 
elemental part of the RN role and was expected to be a finding in this study.  It was not 
one of the findings.  Thus, I would recommend that actions be taken to incorporate 
measures into IT security processes and RN workflow to achieve this objective. 
Venkatesh et al. (2003) discussed UTAUT and the constructs but did not connect 
the IT security practices of employees with the perceptions of the four constructs that 
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contribute to use behavior.  The RNs’ expressed a lack of understanding of IT security in 
this study.  If there were to be an increase in understanding of the UTAUT constructs in a 
meaningful way the IT security would become more applicable in the operational setting. 
Out of this work, I have developed a framework for reducing barriers in security 
practices that are necessary within the RN workflow, decreasing risk of protected health 
information release, and decreasing security breach for the organization.  This framework 
is produced by providing knowledge areas for improvement to the overall security 
practice at the front line.  The framework for improving IT security at the frontline is 
presented for implementation in clinical environment locations (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Framework for IT security improvement.  The healthcare clinical setting is 




Based on this work toward a framework, social change is likely to be promoted by 
helping employees to gain ease of use in the security practices.  The change in the 
promotion of the security practices might be accomplished by minimizing barriers that 
will improve global security practice and reduce overall security breaches for the 
organization.  Of importance to the clinical personnel, there will be an associated 
decrease for risk of protected health information release. 
Significance to Social Change 
Utilization behavior of the employee is determined through four of the constructs 
identified by Venkatesh et al. (2003).  The purpose of IT security is only applicable if the 
employee perceives these to be important and purposeful for their practice.  Identifying 
the gap between current theory and perception of RNs’ related to IT security became 
evident in the findings of this study.  These gaps will contribute to the knowledge 
contributions and implications for social change that can impact the healthcare industry.  
The security mishandling by nurses as described by both Albarrak (2012) and Medlin et 
al. (2008) in each of their respective studies was identified in an alternate style in this 
study along with other IT security mishandling situations.  These security issues are 
occurring in a representative group from one of the largest subsets of the healthcare 
employees within healthcare organization thus creating exposure to risk. 
Healthcare costs include the burden of technology costs, security, and breach 
recovery.  Improvements in IT security processes within the healthcare arena would 
allow for a potential impact of cost reduction, patient safety, and patient satisfaction.  
Improving RNs’ engagement within each of the constructs leading to improved use 
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behavior would result in improved security protection and ultimately position healthcare 
for cost reductions as a result of the decreased breach and risk.   
Maintaining the confidence of the general public and minimizing any concerns 
that they have related to potential security issues in an organization is important to the 
bottom line financially.  Increasing the security within the healthcare organizations 
creates a more confident feeling for patients individually and extends to the global public.  
The work of identifying the RNs’ perception with gained insight and potential for 
improvement of the IT security behavior and handling of security practices could become 
the catalyst to some of the change that is needed in healthcare security processes related 
to IT security and management.  The changes that could be made as a result of the 
findings from this study are likely to extend to the community and promote increased 
patient confidence. 
As the findings are disseminated, organizational leaders will implement change 
and include RNs in IT security planning.  Confidence will grow.  Two important aspects 
impact the research, positive social change may be fully realized as insights and 
recommendations are considered and adapted for the populations of clinical employees 
such as RNs.  The first is that when users are more confident that information is secure 
they are more apt to use the electronic health record and with increased use, there is 
potential for maximizing healthcare delivery.  Second, when organizations are able to 
reduce costs and resources used for security those resources can be deployed for other 
healthcare contributions such as providing additional disease prevention, community 




Albarrak (2012), Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015), and Medlin et al. (2008), each 
discussed the employee mishandling of IT security in their quantitative studies.  There 
was a need to understand the lived experiences of those who use the IT security.  In this 
study, I was able to hear the stories of what RNs experienced or believed about what their 
work was related to IT security.  The interaction and observations that they had related to 
the topics of IT security were shared about situations and scenarios.  The themes of data 
did identify sharing of accounts and lack of log-off when walking away from the 
computer.  There was no report by any participant of direct sharing of passwords; 
however, there were consistent reports of awareness for teammates password sharing 
with a subset of participants’ indirect involvement in that sharing practice within their 
respective work units.  The summary of the RNs’ shared information and experiences 
including that the patient care would always come first no matter what it takes to 
accomplish that mission.  This was consistent with the findings that clinicians do not 
engage in IT security, including sharing passwords, before they allow harm to their 
patients (Koppel, Smith, Blythe, & Kothari, 2015).  Ultimately, IT security will have to 
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Appendix C: Expert Panel Participation Request Email 
Title: Expert Panel Participation Request 
 
Dear [Participant Reviewer], 
I am currently a doctoral candidate in the College of Management at Walden University 
studying Information Management Systems.  I am conducting a dissertation study titled A 
Qualitative Exploration of the Security Practices of Registered Nurses.  I would be very 
appreciative if you would assist me in the evaluation and validation of the qualitative 
interview tool for use in this research. 
The purpose of this interview is to explore the lived experiences of the nurse related to 
Information Technology (IT) security.  The interview is constructed to correlate with the 
unified theory of acceptance and usage of technology (UTAUT) constructs to identify the 
registered nurses’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT 
security.    
The Interview Questions and Critique Form are attached for your review.  Following my 
receipt of all edits and comments, I will forward a final revised copy to you for review.  
Please feel free to contact me with any questions at XXX XXX-XXXX or email 
beth.savage@xxxx.xxx. 










Appendix D: Interview Questions 
I. Can you tell me about a time during your workday, if any, when you have walked away from the 
computer without logging off? 
a. Do you know if anyone has ever used your account? 
b. Are you aware of any safeguards in place to protect you when you walk away without 
logging off? 
c. Is it a norm in your unit to log-off or not log-off when walking away from the computer? 
II. What challenges, if any, have you had related to your password? 
a. How easy is it for you to use your password? 
b. Have you ever shared your account/password with coworkers? 
c. In what clinical situations, if any, would sharing your account/password occur? 
d. What benefit or reward is there to sharing an account/password? 
e. Do passwords support your workflow? 
III. What measures do you take to manage your password? 
a. When you develop or change your password what is it composed of? (i.e. digits, letters, 
symbols, minimum eight characters?) 
b. What do you do when someone else knows your password? 
c. How do you remember your password? 
d. How often do you change it? 
e. Do you ever worry about your password? 
IIII. Can you tell me about your orientation, unit education, or hospital policies related to IT security? 
a. Do you recall anything specific in your orientation? 
b. Have you been to any recent education for IT security? 
c. Does anyone on your unit talk about IT security? 
d. Have you participated in a policy review for IT security? 
V. Can you tell me who, if anyone, you would call if you had questions about the security of your 
password or your account? 
a. Do you have confidence that your concerns would be taken seriously? 
b. Are you, or have you ever been concerned that your system is not secure? 
c. Whose role is it to maintain the security of the electronic system? 
VI. As you perceive different levels of IT security, very secure to not secure, is there a difference in 
your work environment? 
a. If the system is more secure, does that make your job better? 
b. Do you believe you are expected to know IT security as part of your job? 
c. What do you believe is the practice of your teammates when handling passwords and 
sharing accounts? 
VII. In what way, if any, do you believe that the employees’ actions at the computer or with a password 
has any association when hacking occurs in an organization? 
a. In what ways could the password handling lead to hacking? 
b. What, if any, would the impact be to the employees? 
c. What, if any, would the impact be to the patients? 
d. What, if any, would the impact be to the organization? 
VIII. What do you perceive as other aspects of IT security that I should be aware of from your 
experience with IT security in your work? 
